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Over the past four years, the increase in terror attacks and the influx of refugees has 
created a crisis of secularism in many parts of Western Europe (Modood 2012:5; Torpey 
2010:288). This is the result of what Modood (2012:6) describes as the reversal of population 
flows of European colonialism. At the same time, the presence of religion in many Western 
European countries, while still evident, has become increasingly invisible. The gradual secular 
nature of many Western European countries, alongside an increasing presence of Muslims 
settling in these nations, has contributed to this so-called identity crisis. Consequently, there has 
been recent attempts to prevent the use of overt symbols of religiosity in open spaces (Modood 
2015:5). This was evident within the recent attempts in France to ban the burqa, and the even 
more recent “burkini” ban (Davis 2011:119). This paper attempts to question whether this 
Islamophobic rhetoric that has become widespread throughout Western Europe and the United 
States is a result of the increasingly secular nature of many countries within the Western world, 
and whether gender plays a role in this relationship. Most of the existing literature that questions 
the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia focuses solely on the relationship within 
the context of France and other Western European countries. However, it is important to question 
whether this relationship between Islamophobia and secularism exists in the United States, a 
country which simultaneously contains a secular and a strong religious presence.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In order to understand whether secularism has played a role in the increasingly prevalent 
Islamophobic rhetoric within Western Europe and the United States, a conceptualization of  
Islamophobia is needed. Put simply, Islamophobia is described as the stereotypical 
generalizations about Islam and Muslims that can result in discrimination or harassment 
(Moosavi 2015:41). Hatred against Muslims appears in both overt and subtle forms. When 
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speaking of Islamophobia, most think of overt discrimination taking the form of physical abuse. 
However, the subtle and less transparent forms of Islamophobia are equally as important, 
through which Muslims are confronted with hostility and exclusion in their day-to-day lives, 
without it being obvious (Moosavi 2015:48). Additionally, a number of scholars have 
emphasized the historical roots of Islamophobia rather than framing it as a new phenomenon 
(Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611; Soyer 2013:400).  
Historical Roots of Islamophobia 
Islam has been categorized as “other” or inferior to other religions since the 1400s 
(Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611). The struggle between Christian Spain and 
Islam formed part of a longer imperial battle in the Mediterranean that dates back to the 
crusades. In 1492, the Christian Spanish monarchy re-conquered Islamic Spain, forcing Jews and 
Arab Muslims from the area, while simultaneously “discovering” the Americas and conquering 
various parts of the world (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2). As a result, a division of labor was 
created, privileging populations of European origin over the rest. At the same time, Jews and 
Muslims became the internal “Other” within Europe (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Soyer 
2013:402; Mingolo 2006:18). In the late 15
th
 century, Jews and Muslims were divided even 
further and were classified as practicing the “wrong religion,” placing them as “savage” and 
“primitive” people. Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006:8) describe this as the subalternization and 
inferiorization of Islam, based on the idea of “pure blood.” This classification promoted the idea 
that Islamic civilizations were inferior and uncivilized. However, Andalusian, Mughal, and 
Ottoman experiences show that Islamic civilizations were more structured and refined than 
Western nations (Şentürk and Nizamuddin 2008:519). This category of “otherness” has 
continued to grow and has transformed into a type of cultural racism that frames itself in terms of 
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inferior habits, beliefs, behaviors, or values of a group of people (Grosfoguel and Mielants 
2006:4). What is seen as the “right” religion is those only supported by a Judeo-Christian culture, 
and what is seen as “inhuman” follows from a departure of that culture (Butler 2008:12). 
Islamophobia continues to be framed in this way; transformed as a type of colonial racism to a 
newly formed cultural racism that targets Muslims as being inherently different and inferior to 
white Europeans. While Islamophobia is a form of discrimination against Muslims, it is 
important to understand the ways in which gender plays a role within this form of cultural racism 
as well.  
Muslim Women and Islamophobia 
 The intersection of religion and gender is important to discuss when conceptualizing 
discrimination against Muslims. Veiled women living in Western Europe have been increasingly 
classified as inferior because of the overt “Islamic marker” that they wear (Afshar 2008:421). 
While all Muslims are subjected to forms of discrimination, Muslim women’s experiences 
should be categorized as a different form of exclusion that is not only based on race and religion, 
but also gender. The discrimination faced by Muslim women takes both physical and subtle 
forms. Drawing off of Edward Said’s iconic work, it is important to conceptualize the subtle 
forms of discrimination faced by Muslim women as orientalism (Said 1978:10). This form of 
discrimination operates through the eroticization of Muslim women (Said 1978:10; Afshar 
2008:421). If Muslim women are not seen as threatening, they are perceived as being exotic and 
submissive to their faith (Afshar 2008:421). These assumptions promote the idea that the West 
must rush to liberate Muslim women from the "oppression" that is imposed on them by their 
faith (Abu-Lughod 2002:789; Afshar 2008:420). This white “savior” mentality and the image of 
Muslim women as being “oppressed” works to justify cultural racism that ultimately targets 
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Muslims, constructing them as “inferior” and “uncivilized” people who do not belong in the 
West (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:6). The headscarf, in particular, plays an important role in 
the construction of this imagery because it is seen as a "subversive force when it emerges in the 
secular public sphere, asserting its own unconventional and nonsecular (Islamic) norms of 
privacy" (Çindar 2008:903). As a result, when Muslim women wear headscarves in public 
spaces, the piece of clothing imposes an Islamic frame and labels the women as being inherently 
different, and therefore a threat to secularism (Çindar 2008:903). The increasingly secular nature 
of Western Europe and the United States may have further promoted this cultural racism that 
classifies Islam as being incompatible with the West.  
Secularism  
Peter Berger’s (2012) revised secularization theory helps conceptualize the ways in 
which secularism is framed within many Western European countries and in the United States as 
well. Berger (2012:313) argues that while there are many forms that secularism can take, it 
operates through a decline of religion. This decline of religion is experienced on both micro and 
macro levels, encompassing not only individuals being less religious, but also social institutions 
separating themselves from religion as well (Berger 2012:314). Berger argues that, “There is 
indeed a secular discourse resulting from modernity, but it can coexist with religious discourses 
that are not secular at all” (2012:314). This idea is extremely applicable to the United States 
formation of secularism that coexists with religious discourses at the same time.   
Other scholars have questioned the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia, 
specifically within Western European countries (Torpey 2010:280; Modood 2011:5). There are 
two ways of looking at secularism that have been previously overlooked: active and latent 
religiosity (Torpey 2010:280). Active religiosity refers to people who practice their religions in 
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public spheres. Conversely, latent religiosity manifests itself more subtly (Torpey 2010:280). 
This latent form of religion can spark an identity crisis when confronted with groups that practice 
their religions openly as a result of the increasing secular nature of many parts of Western 
Europe (Modood 2011:5). For example, surveys in London show that immigrant groups that 
settle in London become increasingly secular, while for Muslims, the reverse tendency applies 
(Laitin 2010:431). Consequently, some Europeans question whether or not Muslims should be 
allowed to practice their religions openly in a country that emphasizes secular values (Laitin 
2010:431).  
In order to understand the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia within the 
context of the United States, this paper draws on Annalisa Frisina’s (2010) two frameworks of 
Islamophobia: the new orientalist and security frames. The new orientalist framework is related 
to the work cited above, portraying Islam as the cultural and religious opposite of the West, 
therefore classifying it as incompatible to Western values and cultures (Frisina 2010:560). 
Additionally, the security frame is important because it is based on a sort of shifting form of 
orientalism that promotes ideas of Muslims as dangerous because they are likely to be 
“terrorists” (Frisina 2010:560). In this case, Islamophobia is most often justified due to this idea 
that Muslims are a threat to “national security” (Frisina 2010:560). While the literature I have 
included above are extensive investigations on secularism and its relationship with Islamophobia, 
only a few sources discuss secularism and Islamophobia in the United States. Drawing from the 
literature above, this paper attempts to understand the relationship between secularism and 
Islamophobia in the United States utilizing quantitative data analysis.  
RESEARCH METHODS  
7 
 This research is based on the data provided by the Public Religion Research Institute's 
(PRRI) survey on Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration, conducted in 2011 (PRRI 2011). 
The data set is composed of a random sample of American adults, 18 years or older, totaling 
2,450 respondents. The unit of analysis in this data set is individuals. The data was collected 
through phone interviews under the supervision of Directions in Research. The responses were 
weighted in two stages. The first stage of weighting corrected for different probabilities of 
selection associated with the number of adults in each household and telephone usage patterns of 
each respondent (PRRI 2011). Additionally, in the second stage sample, demographics were 
balanced by form to match target population parameters for gender, age, education, race, region, 
population density, and telephone usage (PRRI 2011). The margin of error is +/-2.0 percentage 
points for the general sample at the 95 percent confidence interval. Additionally, the response 
rate is 5.67 percent (PRRI 2011). The survey asked questions about political climate in the 
United States, including questions about discrimination, September 11
 
attacks, religion, and 
questions about race. For more information about data collection, see the 2011 Pluralism-
Immigration-&-Civic-Integration online. 
Independent Variable 
 Using the Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration Survey, I formed the independent 
variable from the question that asks whether one completely agrees, mostly agrees, mostly 
disagrees, or completely disagrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. I 
used this variable to operationalize secularism, which takes the form of the separation of church 
and state in the United States. I recoded this variable to give the highest value to a respondent 
who completely agrees with maintaining a separation of church and state. The coding of the 
variable follows this order: completely disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and 
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completely agree (4). Additionally, I used three dependent variables to measure discrimination 
against Muslims and Muslim women.  
Dependent Variables 
 The first dependent variable asks whether someone completely agrees, mostly agrees, 
mostly disagrees, or completely disagrees that the values of Islam, the Muslim religion, are at 
odds with American values and culture. I used this variable to operationalize a form of 
Islamophobia because it relates to the idea that Islam is incompatible to Western values, and 
therefore, justifies the exclusion of Muslims. I also had to recode this variable to make 
completely agree the highest value. The coding of the variable follows this order: completely 
disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and completely agree (4).  
The second dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat 
comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with a mosque being built near 
their home. I used this variable to operationalize a form of Islamophobia based on the security 
frame that labels Muslims as threats to democracy and secularism. If people believe that 
Muslims are threats and are incompatible with American values, they may feel uncomfortable 
with mosques being built near their homes. I did not recode this variable because the highest 
value measures feeling very uncomfortable. The coding of the variable follows this order: very 
comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat uncomfortable (3), and very 
uncomfortable (4).  
The last dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat 
comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with Muslim women wearing 
clothing that covers their whole bodies, including their faces. I used this variable to 
operationalize another form of Islamophobia. When people see the Islamic veil on Muslim 
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women, they may feel uncomfortable around them due to the perception of Muslims as threats 
and as inherently different to Western forms of modernity. The coding of the last dependent 
variable follows this order: very comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat 
uncomfortable (3), very uncomfortable (4).  
Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variable and the three dependent variables, I included two 
control variables in the analysis. The first control variable is religion because I wanted to know 
whether a respondents' religious affiliation has an effect on their perceptions of Muslims. I 
dummied this variable to measure whether someone is Roman Catholic (1) or not Roman 
Catholic (0). It was necessary for me to categorize the religion variable as Roman Catholic or not 
in order to achieve an 80 to 20 percent distribution. Respondents who reported not being Roman 
Catholic consisted of people who identified as Protestant, Mormon, Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist, 
Hindu, Christian, Unitarian, Atheist, Agnostic, nothing in particular, and something else. I 
excluded Muslims, which consisted of only seven cases from the analysis because I wanted to 
know how non-Muslims felt about Muslims in the United States.  
The second control variable was age because it is said that older generations hold 
strongly to religious beliefs, while younger generations have more secular beliefs. The survey’s 
age range is from 18 to 94 years (PRRI 2011). Through the analysis, most of the variables I used 
are ordinal variables. As a result, I understand that I am violating assumptions by treating 
ordinal-level variables as interval level.  
FINDINGS 
Table 1 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for all of the variables. The 
distribution of the independent variable can be seen in Figure 1. The histogram shows that about 
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70 percent of the respondents reported that they agree with the separation of church and state, 
suggesting that a majority of the respondents favor having a strict separation of church and state 
in the United States. Table 1 also reports that the mean is 2.9 and the median is three. This 
suggests that the average level of agreement and the middle value is mostly agreeing with 
maintaining a strict separation of church and state. The standard deviation for the independent 
variable is one, meaning that there is slight deviation in the variable, however, the standard 
deviation is close to zero making the mean more reliable.  
 
Table 1: Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations for All Variables 
Variables Mean Median SD (N) 
Separation of Church and State   2.93 3.0 1.028 (2097) 
Islam at odds with Amer. values    2.55 3.0 0.991 (2033) 
Mosque being built near home   2.55 3.0 1.115 (2078) 
Muslim women covering bodies   2.51 3.0 1.102 (2102) 
Roman Catholic/ Not   0.75 1.0 0.432 (2134) 
Age 53.25             55.0     18.777 (2134) 
 
 
Figure 1. Histogram of “We Must Maintain a Strict Separation of Church and State”  
11 
 
 The survey asked the respondents' level of agreement with the question, "Islam is at odds 
with American values and culture." The distribution of the variable can be seen in Figure 2. The 
histogram shows that there is almost an even number of respondents who agree with the above 
statement and the number of respondents who disagree with the above statement. This suggests 
that respondents both disagree and agree that Islam is at odds with the values and culture of the 
United States. Additionally, Table 1 reports that the mean of this dependent variable is 2.6, 
which shows that the average level of agreement is mostly agreeing with Islam being at odds 
with American values and culture. Table 1 also reports that the standard deviation of this 
dependent variable is one. Since the standard deviation is close to zero, there is slight distribution 
in the variable, but not significant skew. Also, the standard deviation suggests that the mean is 
more reliable.  
 
Figure 2. Histogram of Islam at Odds with American Values and Culture 
Additionally, the survey asked the respondents' level of comfort with "A mosque being 
built near your home." Figure 3 shows the distribution of respondents who felt comfortable or 
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uncomfortable with a mosque being built near their homes. There is an even distribution between 
respondents who felt comfortable about a mosque being built near their home and respondents 
who felt uncomfortable. Table 1 also reports the mean of this dependent variable as 2.6, 
suggesting the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with a mosque being built 
near their home. The median is two, which means that the middle value is somewhat comfortable 
with a mosque being built near their home. The standard deviation is 1.1, which shows that there 
is slight distribution in the variable, but the standard deviation makes the mean more reliable 
because it is close to zero. 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of Mosque Built Near Home 
The survey asked the respondents' level of comfort to the question, "Muslim women 
wearing clothing that covers their whole body, including their faces." Figure 4 shows that there is 
an even distribution of the respondents' who feel comfortable and uncomfortable with the above 
statement. The percentage of respondents who are comfortable is almost equal to the percentage 
of respondents who are uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their bodies, including 
their faces. Table 1 reports the mean for this variable as 2.5 while the median is three, suggesting 
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that the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their 
bodies, including their faces. The standard deviation is reported as 1.1, which shows that the 
mean is reliable and there is only slight distribution in the variable.  
              
Figure 4. Histogram of Muslim Women Covering their Bodies 
 The survey asked about the respondents' religious affiliation. I dummied this variable and 
only showed which respondents identified as being Roman Catholic and which respondents 
identified as something else. Around 25 percent of the respondents identified as Roman Catholic, 
while about 75 percent of the respondents identified as not being Roman Catholic. Table 1 shows 
that the mean for the control variable is .24, meaning that most of the respondents are not Roman 
Catholic. Additionally, the standard deviation of this control variable is .43, suggesting that there 
is little deviation and the mean is more reliable since the standard deviation is close to zero.  
 The survey also asked a question about the age of the respondents. The survey consists of 
adults ranging from 18 to 94 years. Figure 6 shows the distribution of respondents' ages, 
suggesting that most of the respondents were between 50 to 70 years old. About ten percent of 
the respondents are 80 years and older. Additionally, about twenty-five percent of the 
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respondents are 20 to 40 years old. Table 1 reports that the average age of the respondents is 53. 
The median age is about 54, and the standard deviation is 18 years. The standard deviation 
suggests that the respondents’ ages ranged from 34 to 72, which makes up about 60 percent of 
the respondents. Because the standard deviation is 18, there is significant skew in the variable.  
 
Figure 5. Histogram of Age 
Bivariate Results 
 Table 2 shows the results of the bivariate analysis between the dependent variables, 
independent variable, and control variables. The bivariate results indicate a moderate, positive, 
statistically significant relationship (r = .324) between the two dependent variables, indicating 
that the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds with American values and culture, the 
more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being near their home. Additionally, the 
bivariate results indicate a weak to moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = 
.225) with the other dependent variable, suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that Islam 
is at odds with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with 
Muslim women covering their bodies including their faces. The bivariate results also indicate a 
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moderate to strong, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = .494) between the other two 
dependent variables, suggesting that the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque 
being built near their home, the more uncomfortable they feel with Muslim women covering 
their bodies, including their faces.  
In terms of the first dependent variable (Islam at odds) and the independent variable, 
Table 2 indicates a weak, negative, statistically significant relationship (r = -.130), suggesting 
that the more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, 
the more a respondent disagrees with Islam being at odds with American values and culture. For 
the second dependent variable, which asks respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being 
built near their home, the bivariate results indicate a weak, negative, moderate, and statistically 
significant relationship (r = -.271), suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that we must 
maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a 
mosque being built near their home. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate that there is a 
negative, weak, and statistically significant relationship (r = -.101), between the third dependent 
variable, Muslim women covering their bodies, and the independent variable. As a result, the 
more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more 
comfortable a respondent feels with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces.  
Table 2. Correlations (r) between Separation of Church and State and Dependent Variables 
(listwise deletion, two-tailed test, N=1932) 
Variables Mosque Covering Church and 
State 
Roman 
Catholic 
Age 
Islam at odds .322** .226**  .129** -.067** .106** 
Mosque  .496** -.270**  .036 .243** 
Covering Bodies    .101** -.014 .242** 
16 
Church and State    -.043  .020 
Roman Catholic     -.045 
** p < .01 
 
 Table 2 shows the bivariate results for the control variables as well. The bivariate results 
indicate no relationship between respondents who are Roman Catholic and whether a respondent 
agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. The Roman Catholic 
variable has no relationship with a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near 
their home and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. However, the 
bivariate results indicate a negative, weak, statistically significant relationship (r = -.067) 
between one of the dependent variables, suggesting that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, the 
respondent is less likely to agree that Islam is at odds with American values and culture.  
 The bivariate results indicate statistically significant relationships between the three 
dependent variables and respondents’ ages. Table 2 shows that there is a weak, positive, 
statistically significant relationship (r = .106) between age and the Islam at odds variable, 
suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more the respondent agrees that Islam is at odds 
with American values and culture. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate a weak but almost 
moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = .243) between age and a 
respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home, meaning that the older 
a respondent is, the more uncomfortable they feel with a mosque being built near their home. 
Lastly, the bivariate results in Table 2 indicate a strong, weak but almost moderate, positive, and 
statistically significant relationship (r = .242) between age and Muslim women covering their 
bodies, suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more uncomfortable the respondent feels 
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with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. The bivariate results indicate 
no relationship between age and whether a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict 
separation of church and state.  
Multivariate Findings 
The multiple regression analysis reported in Table 3 shows that 3.3 percent of the 
variance in the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman Catholic and age, is 
explained by a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values 
and culture. Additionally, the multiple regression demonstrates that 13 percent of the variance in 
a respondents’ agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman 
Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near 
their homes. Lastly, the multiple regression portrays that 6.5 percent of the variance in a 
respondents’ level of agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant 
Roman Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents’ level of comfort with Muslim women 
covering their bodies, including their faces. While the R squared values are small, the F-test 
shows that all three of the regressions are significant.  Of the three dependent variables, the 
independent variable has the most effect on a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being 
built near their home (Beta = -.266). The independent variable has the second strongest effect on 
a respondents' level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values and culture 
(Beta = -.127). Additionally, the independent variable has the least effect on the level of comfort 
with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces (Beta = -.097).  
  The first control variable, whether a respondent is Roman Catholic, is only significant 
with one of the dependent variables, a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam at odds with 
American values and culture (Beta = -.070). While Roman Catholic is only significant with one 
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dependent variable, the second control variable, age, is significant with all three dependent 
variables. Age has the most effect on a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built 
near their home (Beta = .249). Additionally, age has the second strongest effect on a 
respondents’ level of comfort with Muslim women covering their bodies (Beta = .239). Age has 
the least effect on a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American 
values and culture (Beta = .113).  
Table 3. Regression of Dependent Variables and Separation of Church and State, Roman 
Catholic, and Respondent’s Age 
 
p < .01 
DISCUSSION 
 These findings are not consistent with the large body of literature on the relationship 
between secularism and Islamophobia in Western Europe. Secularism does in fact have a 
relationship with Islamophobia, but within the context of the United States, the relationship is 
negative. The results suggest that the more secular an individual is, the more open they are to 
Muslims being in the country. The results specifically report that the more a respondent agrees 
with the separation of church and state, the less they agree that Islam is at odds with American 
values and culture. Additionally, the more a respondent agrees with the separation of church and 
state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being built near their homes and 
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with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. This may be due to the fact that 
while there is an increase in secularism in the United States, religion still has a strong presence 
within the country. 
Berger (2012:4) describes this phenomenon by saying that secularism coexists with 
religion in the United States. In fact, he goes against his former theory of secularism by stating 
that with modernity comes pluralism. Berger (2012:4) states that Western Europe is unique 
because the countries were created by a state church, where the two were not separate, whereas 
the United States started out with pluralism (Berger 2012:4). As a result, people with secular 
values can be religious at the same time, because the form that secularism takes in the United 
States is based on promoting liberty for citizens to practice religions freely. While the United 
States promotes freedom for practicing religions, pluralization can become a challenge when 
there are too many different forms of religions that coexist in a single space (Modood 2012:5). 
As a result, when Muslims are viewed through this oriental frame and are seen as a threat, non-
Muslims may feel conflicted when they are exposed to Muslims practicing their religions in the 
public sphere (Modood 2012:5).  
The multivariate results also report that age forms a positive relationship with all of the 
dependent variables. The older a respondent is, the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds 
with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent is with a mosque being 
built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. 
Older generations may hold increasingly prejudiced beliefs against Muslims due to the ways in 
which Islam has been portrayed throughout the United States. Additionally, it may be because 
the Muslim population has increased in recent years and older generations may not have been 
exposed to Muslims practicing their religions openly. As a result, older generations may rely 
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more on stereotypical beliefs of Muslims. The multivariate findings show that the Roman 
Catholic variable is related to only one of the dependent variables (Islam at Odds), suggesting 
that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, they are less likely to believe that Islam is incompatible 
with American values and culture. This may be due to the fact that Roman Catholics are diverse 
and come from other parts of the world. While Roman Catholicism is not the biggest religious 
sect in the United States, Roman Catholics make up about 22 percent of the United States 
population (PRRI 2011). Additionally, younger generations of Roman Catholics may have been 
raised in households where Roman Catholic values have been passed down. As a result, they 
may be more accepting of Muslims.  
 While the results turned out to show a negative relationship with variables that 
operationalized Islamophobia, the bivariate results portray that Islamophobia is prevalent in the 
United States. In fact, each variable that operationalized Islamophobia was positively and almost 
moderately related to one another. As a result, the new oriental and security frames apply in the 
context of the United States. Through the new orientalist frame, the main reason why Muslims 
experience discrimination is because of the idea that Islam is incompatible with Western forms 
of modernity (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:4; Frisina 2010:560). The security frame 
perpetuates the belief that Muslims are threats to American democracy (Frisina 2010:560). These 
two frames can create the perception that the Islamic headscarf is threatening and places Muslim 
women as cultural inferior because it is a “subversive force” when it appears in the public sphere 
(Çindar 2008:903). Similarly, mosques can be perceived as threating in Western Europe and the 
United States because Islam is seen as the cultural opposite of Western cultures and values, 
therefore people can react negatively to mosques and may feel uncomfortable having one built 
near their home. Afshar (2008:413) states, “Clearly Orientalism is not merely part of a forgotten 
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past; it remains very much at the core of the current history of race and gender in the West and 
current wars in the Middle East.” The perception of Muslim women as uncivilized and 
“oppressed” has been used to justify United States’ foreign policy and ongoing interference in 
the Middle East (Afshar 2008:415; Abu-Lughod 2002:789). Islamophobia is continuously 
justified in the United States because of the depiction of Muslims as “backward” and threats to 
national security (Frisina 2010:560). 
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I attempted to understand the relationship between Islamophobia and 
secularism within the context of the United States, and tried to see how gender plays a role in 
this relationship. I also attempted to conceptualize how Islamophobia functions through Frisina’s 
(2010) new orientalist and security frames. Using the data from the 2011 Pluralism-Immigration-
&-Civic-Integration survey created by the Public Religion Research Institute, the proceeding 
analysis displayed a negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with 
maintaining a strict separation of church and state and a respondents’ level of agreement with 
Islam being at odds with American values and culture. Additionally, the analysis showed a 
negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with maintaining a strict 
separation of church and state and whether a respondent was uncomfortable with a mosque being 
built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. 
Secularism in the United States is particular in that it promotes the separation of church and state 
but there continues to be a strong religious presence within the country. Consequently, this may 
have played a role in the negative relationship between secularism and Islamophobia in the 
United States displayed in the multivariate analysis.  
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While this paper portrays important implications regarding the ways in which 
Islamophobia functions in the United States, there were a number of limitations in this study. 
One important limitation is the data set that was used. The data set had a very small response rate 
of 5.67%, which means that it may not be generalizable to the United States population. 
Consequently, further research using a different data set is needed in order to formulate results 
that are generalizable to the United States population. Another limitation has to do with the type 
of variables that were used in this study. Because I used data provided by the Public Religious 
Research Institute, the type of questions asked were out of my control. I used ordinal variables, 
and as a result, had to make assumptions regarding the responses that were reported in the 
survey. While there are limitations in this paper, the results provide an important insight on the 
ways in which Islamophobia functions in the United States.  
While the results showed that there was a negative relationship between secularism and 
Islamophobia, the results displayed the fact that Islamophobia has a presence in the United 
States. In light of recent political events that have taken place in the country, it is important to 
think about Islamophobia not solely as hatred against Muslims due to the idea that they pose a 
threat to security and democracy, but also to view Islamophobic rhetoric as directly related to 
orientalist ideas that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized.” For example, when 
thinking of Islamophobia through these two frameworks, it is easier to understand why and how 
the recent Travel Ban in the United States was justified. Most of the discourse surrounding this 
ban was on the idea that Muslims from “certain countries” should be restricted from entering the 
United States due to national security reasons (Laughland 2017). However, embedded within this 
rhetoric are orientalist tropes that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized” people that 
are incompatible with the United States’ form of democracy and secularism. In order to 
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understand the ways in which Islamophobic rhetoric functions within the two frames, placing 
Islamophobia in a historical context is essential (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:3). Additionally, 
thinking about gender and the way it intersects with Islamophobia emphasizes the need to 
challenge Western feminist discourse that reproduces the image of a “Muslim women” as one 
that needs “saving” (Abu-Lughod 2002:784). If we continue to think of how Islamophobia 
operates through the new orientalist and security frames that are often deployed to justify 
discrimination and the exclusion of Muslims, we will be able to challenge Islamophobic rhetoric 
and create a more understanding and open community.  
  
24 
 
REFERENCES 
Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2002. “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological 
Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Other.” American Anthropologist 104(3):783-
790. 
Afshar, Haleh. 2008. “Can I See Your Hair? Choice, Agency and Attitudes: The Dilemma of 
Faith and Feminism for Muslim Women Who Cover.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 
31(2):411-427. 
Assad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford, CA: 
University Press. 
Beckford, James. 2008. “Secularism and Coercive Freedoms.” The British Journal of Sociology 
59(1):41-45. 
Berger, Peter L. 2012. “Further Thoughts on Religion and Modernity.” Society 49(4):1-9. 
Butler, Judith. 2008. “Sexual Politics, Torture, and Secular Time.” The British Journal of 
Sociology 59(1):1-23. 
Çindar, Alev. 2008. "Subversion and Subjugation in the Public Sphere: Secularism and the 
Islamic Headscarf." SIGNS 33(4):891-913. 
Davis, Britton D. 2011. “Lifting the Veil: France’s New Crusade.” Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review 34(1):117-145. 
Edward, Said. 1978. Orientalism. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.  
Frisina, Annalisa. 2010. “Young Muslims of Italy. Islam in the Everyday Life and the Public 
Visibility of a New Generation of Muslims.” Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion 
1: 329-352. 
25 
Garner, Steve and Saher Selod. 2014. “The Racialization of Muslims: Empirical Studies of 
Islamophobia.” Critical Sociology 41(1):9-19. 
Geisser, Vincent. 2010. “Islamophobia: A French Specificity in Europe?” Human Architecture: 
Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 8(2):39-46. 
Grosfoguel, Ramon and Eric Mielants. 2006. “The Long-Duree Entanglement between 
Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/ Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System.” 
Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge (1):1-12.  
Halliday, Fred. 1999. “‘Islamophobia’ Reconsidered.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22(5):892-902.  
 Kayaoglu, Turan. 2012. “Three Takes on Islamophobia.” International Sociology 27(5):609-
615. 
Laitlin, David. 2010. “Rational Islamophobia in Europe.” European Journal of Sociology 
51(3):429-447. 
Mingolo, Walter. 2006. "Islamophobia/Hispanophobia: The (Re) Configuration of the Racial 
Imperial/Colonial Matrix." Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-
Knowledge 5(1):13-28.  
Modood, Tariq. 2012. “Is There a Crisis of Secularism in Western Europe?” Sociology of 
Religion 73(2):130-149. 
Moosavi, Leon. 2015. “The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences 
of Islamophobia.” Critical Sociology 41(1):41-56. 
Public Religion Research Institute. 2011. Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration Survey 
[MRDF]. Stanford, California: Directions in Research [producer]. Washington D.C.: 
Public Religion Research Institute [distributor].  
26 
Laughland, Oliver. “Trump Travel Ban: US Supreme Court Partially Lifts Block on Order.” The 
Guardian. 27 June 2017.  
 Şentürk, Recep and Ali M. Nizamuddin. 2008. “The Sociology of Civilisations: Ibn Khaldun 
and a Multi-Civilisational World Order.” Asian Journal of Social Science 36(3):516-546. 
Soyer, Francois. 2013. “Faith, Culture and Fear: Comparing Islamophobia in Early Modern 
Spain and Twenty-First-Century Europe.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(3):399-416. 
Torpey, John. 2010. “A (Post-) Secular Age? Religion and the Two Exceptionalisms.” Social 
Research 77(1):269-293.  
Zuckerman, Phil. 2009. “Atheism, Secularity, and Well-Being: How the Findings of Social 
Science Counter Negative Stereotypes and Assumptions.” Sociology Compass 3(6):949-
971.  
 
  
27 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Movements and Memories:  
Education, Age, and Memories of the Women’s Movement 
 
 
Kimberly Longfellow 
 
 
 
Kimberly Longfellow is a 2016 graduate of Gettysburg College. She graduated as the 
Valedictorian of her class with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology and German Studies. She 
conducted the research for this paper as part of her coursework during the fall of her junior year, 
working closely with Professor VoonChin Phua.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
We often think of our memories as extremely private and personal; however, research 
indicates a collective component to the formation of memories. While memories may be stored 
in individuals’ minds, the memories individuals recall as important are often the result of a 
complex social negotiation with the past. Recent research into the process of memory formation 
(Schuman and Scott 1985; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Corning 2010) has specifically studied 
the importance of age in determining what events are deemed memorable by the individual; other 
studies (Larson and Lizardo 2007; Griffin 2004) have indicated that the process of memory 
formation is far more complex, and can be influenced by race, region, and education. These 
demographic factors may be of increased significance when discussing the memories of social 
movements, as a smaller, more specific demographic group may participate in these movements. 
For my study, I will analyze Schuman and Scott’s (1985) and Schuman and Rodgers’ 
(2004) datasets, in which respondents were asked to name two events that have occurred since 
1930 that they believe to be the most significant to American history. While previous research 
has focused specifically on the age of the respondent as an independent variable, education may 
increase in significance as time from the event increases and as the event is incorporated into a 
larger historical narrative. Specifically studying those who recalled the Women’s Movement as 
one of the two most significant events in American history since 1930 in both the earlier and 
later surveys, I will study the following questions: (1)When certain demographic factors such as 
gender, race, and region of residence are considered, do age and education have a significant 
effect on who recalled the Women’s Movement as one of the most important events of recent 
decades? (2)Does the influence of these variables change as the chronological distance from the 
event increases? 
PAST LITERATURE ON COLLECTIVE MEMORIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
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Founding Theories of Collective Memory and the Critical Period of Adolescence  
 While the study of collective memory and memory formation has captured international 
interest beginning especially during the “Memory Boom” of the 1970s, the process of memory 
has been studied since the early 1900s. Theorists such as Maurice Halbwachs (1950) asserted 
that although memories appear to exist within individual’s minds, they are, in actuality, the 
results of micro- and macro-level discourse that reaffirms and reinterprets specific narratives, 
leading to similarities in what is deemed significant across groups and within a population.  
Karl Mannheim (1952) discussed specifically the transmission and reinterpretation of 
memories through time and across generations. As Mannheim (1952:292) notes, society is 
characterized by the constant disappearance of older generations and the exposure of new 
generations to previously gathered knowledge. Mannheim (1952:300-301) thus posits that the 
most important time for memory formation is during these moments of fresh contact, which he 
predicted to occur during the “critical period” of an individual’s adolescence, specifically 
between the ages of 17 and 25. That is to say, events experienced during this period will be 
recalled by the individual as more significant than events that occurred before or after the 
individual’s critical period. 
Quantitative memory studies (Schuman and Scott 1965; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; 
Corning 2010; Larson and Lizardo 2007) have tested if Mannheim’s idea of the “critical period” 
holds true. This involved surveying a large group of individuals, asking demographic questions, 
and then asking them to name two events they believed to be of historical significance within a 
specific time range/location. Many times, events were more likely to be named by people who 
experienced them during their critical period than by those who did not experience them during 
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their critical period (Schuman and Scott 1985; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Corning 2010; 
Jennings 1996). 
The Influence of Factors Beyond Age 
Throughout their critical periods a person experiences infinite moments that could be 
considered “memorable.” A process must exist through which some memories emerge as more 
noteworthy than others. It is unlikely that age alone singularly determines which memories are 
formed and viewed as significant; rather, demographic factors such as race, region of residence, 
and education may also have a noteworthy influence. 
Research has indicated that for specific events that were highly racialized (meaning that 
they specifically dealt with race or tended to include members of one race more than another), 
race was an influential factor in who recalled the particular event as the most important event of 
the given time period (Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Griffin 2004). Similarly, if events were 
heavily tied to specific regions, people from that region would be more likely to recall that event 
as the most important of the given time period (Griffin 2004). Lastly, research studies have 
shown in situations where the event has become historicized and continues to play an active role 
in society (such as historical figures who have later become popularized), the educational level 
of the respondent does influence who is more or less likely to recall the event or figure as the 
most important of a given time period (Larson and Lizardo 2007; Griffin 2004). 
Social Movements and Collective Memory 
Recollections of social movements are particularly interesting to study because they, 
unlike events such as assassinations or terrorist attacks, do not occur in single, dramatic points of 
time, and as such, may be less tied to one specific point in history, and as such, may be less tied 
to people of a specific age. Also, social movements often involve a more specific segment of the 
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population (for example, women were more likely to participate in the Women’s Movement than 
men); therefore, demographic factors such as gender, race, region, and education may have 
increased influence. Focusing specifically on the Women’s Movement, I will observe the 
influence of age when other demographic factors are considered.  
Memory over Time 
 While past research has certainly researched the relationship between specific 
demographic variables and the recollection of specific events, fewer studies have studied 
whether and how the influence of these demographic variables changes over time (Corning 
2013). As time increases from an event, there will eventually come a time when no respondents 
were alive to experience a particular event during their critical periods of adolescence, and they 
rely entirely upon their historical memories. Historical memory may be more strongly influenced 
by education, region of residence, and gender, and how the event is portrayed and consumed 
through public commemoration and media (Corning and Schuman 2013), as these factors may 
shape and alter the way the person encounters and learns about this event. By using two surveys 
conducted about fifteen years apart, I will also observe the influence of age over time, and 
whether other factors such as education become more important as the chronological distance 
from the event increases. 
DATA AND METHODS 
 For this study, I analyzed the longitudinal data collected by Schuman and Rodgers 
(2004), which merged the data originally collected by Schuman and Scott (1985) and their own 
replication of the survey fifteen years later, between 2000 and 2001. Although the data spans two 
time periods, respondents were asked the same question with the same wording and time frame 
of American history. Respondents were asked about demographic information, including their 
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year of birth, gender, race, region, and level of education in terms of years. Lastly, they were 
asked to name two events that occurred in America since 1930 that they believed were the most 
important. As a matter of clarification, it is important to note that by not stating a particular event 
is the most important, it does not imply that all other events are unimportant; rather it simply 
means that it was not regarded as one of the top two significant events named by the respondent. 
 The first survey in 1985 had an N-size of 1,410 and the second survey in 2000-2001 had 
an N-size of 3,884. Together, the merged dataset has an N-size of 5,294. Excluding cases where 
there was missing information in one or more of the independent variables, 5,082 cases were 
included within the regressions. The respondents were asked the following question: “There have 
been a lot of national and world events and changes over the past (50/70) or so years – say, from 
about 1930 right up until today. Would you mention one or two such events or changes that seem 
to you to have been especially important?” (Schuman and Rodgers 2004:219). 
 Memory is incredibly abstract and intangible, and it is not unreasonable to question the 
idea of quantifiably studying memory in favor of qualitative research, such as interviews. 
However, memory is often communicative, and the process of conversing could prompt 
respondents to consider events or memories they otherwise would not have considered initially. 
By utilizing an open-ended survey rather than verbally prompting respondents or having 
respondents select events from a list of 10-20 pre-selected options, Schuman and Scott (2004) 
and Schuman and Rodger’s (2004) encourage the respondent to explore their thoughts 
independently, without specific prompting by a researcher. A survey also standardizes the 
process, there is less of a chance of bias from the researcher influencing the respondent’s answer. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
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 The dependent variable in this study was whether the Women’s Movement was one of 
the two important events named by the respondent or not at all. To avoid selection bias, 
responses in the data marked as “missing” for the Women’s Movement were recoded and 
included with respondents that did not recall the event as significant.  
 In order to compare the influence of factors over time, the data was separated and coded 
into groups of when the survey was completed (1985 or 2000-2001). By splitting the file in the 
logistic regressions, one could see how the influence of specific variables changed between the 
two surveys. 
 Independent variables included age/cohort, gender, race, region, and level of education. 
While it would have been optimal to include variables such as income and political orientation, 
such variables were not included within the original surveys, and thus is a limitation of the data. 
For a full description of how variables were coded, see Appendix 1. 
RESULTS 
Initial Investigation of Variables 
After cases with missing values were excluded, the total N-Size of cases included in the 
logistic regressions was 5,082. No variables had a large enough number of missing cases to 
threaten the quality of the variable as a tool for measurement. For a complete description of the 
univariate results, see Appendix 2. 
Logistic Regression Models 
 In order to test the influence of age and education on the recollections of the Women’s 
Movement, multiple logistic regressions were run. Each model included variables such as 
gender, race, and region, and one at a time, variables measuring education and variations of age 
were added. See Table 1 for all models. 
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 Model 1 was included to serve as a control model, where neither education nor any 
variation of age was included. This model shows how demographic factors such as gender, 
region, and race influenced who did and did not recall the Women’s Movement. In 1985, gender 
had the largest and most significant impact, with women being more likely to recall the 
Women’s Movement by a factor of 5.425 as compared to men. This finding is significant at 
p<0.001. In 2000-2001, gender was still a highly influential variable but by a smaller factor, with 
women being more likely to recall the Women’s Movement by a factor of 3.456 as compared to 
men. This finding is also significant at p<0.001.  
 In Model 2, the variable, “education” was introduced. Education was coded into an 
ordinal variable with five values indicating different ranges of years of education (with “1” being 
the fewest years of education, and “5” being the highest number of years of education). In the 
1985 data, education was not significant even at p<0.10. However, in the 2000-2001 data, 
education did have an effect. For every 1 unit increase in the level of education, the odds of 
recalling the Women’s Movement as a significant event increased by a factor of 1.271. These 
findings are significant at p<0.10. Education continued to be significant at p<0.10 for the 2000-
2001 data through the rest of the models, even after the inclusion of age. 
 In Model 3, the first variation on the variable “age” was introduced. This variable was 
simply a scale variable that recorded the age of the respondent when he or she took the survey. In 
both the 1985 and the 2000-2001 data, the variable “age” was not significant at p<0.10. 
 In Model 4, the second variation on the variable “age” was introduced. This variation on 
the “age” variable was a scale variable that recorded the birth year of the respondent. While this 
variable is, in theory, extremely similar to the “age” variable, it is slightly different. Because the 
survey was completed at two different points in time, a respondent in 1985 could have the same 
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age as a respondent in 2000-2001, yet they could have different birth years. For example, a 
respondent who is recorded as 25 in the 1985 survey would have been born in 1960, whereas a 
respondent who is recorded as 25 in the 2000-2001 survey would have been born in 1975-1976. 
Including both of these variables examines whether people who happen to be around the same 
age (regardless of the time period) are interested in the same events. In both the 1985 and the 
2000-2001 data, however, the variable “cohort” was not significant at p<0.10.  
 In Model 5, a third variation of age was introduced. In this variable, the birth year of the 
respondent was subtracted from the year 1970 (the approximate mid-point of the Women’s 
Movement, which spanned the 1960s and 1970s). This would give the age of the respondent 
during the Women’s Movement. These ages were then grouped into “before,” “during,” and 
“after” Mannheim’s critical period (ages 17 through 25), with the reference group being those 
who experienced the Women’s Movement during the critical period. In the 1985 data, people 
who were above Mannheim’s critical period were less likely to recall the Women’s Movement as 
significant by a factor of 0.359 as compared to those during their critical period. These findings 
were significant at p<0.05. However, in the 2000-2001 data, neither cohort group had a 
significant relationship to who recalled the Women’s Movement, even at p<0.10. 
 In Model 6, an extended version of Mannheim’s critical period was used to examine 
whether this would strengthen existing patterns. Corning (2010) used a slightly extended version 
of Mannheim’s critical period, which went from the age of 12 to the age of 29. In the 1985 data, 
people who were above Mannheim’s critical period during the Women’s Movement were less 
likely to recall the Women’s Movement by a factor of 0.395 as compared to those who were in 
the extended version of Mannheim’s critical period during the Women’s Movement. This result 
is significant at p<0.05. Similar to Model 10, in the 2000-2001 survey neither cohort group had a 
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significant relationship to who recalled the Women’s Movement even at p<0.10. Together these 
findings indicate that in terms of the Women’s Movement, age is not the only important factor in 
the formation of memories. More so, age becomes less influential as the chronological distance 
from the Women’s Movement increases. 
 
Table 1: Multivariate Logistic Regressions Predicting the Odds of Recalling the Women’s Movement 
Dependent Variable: Respondent Recalling the Women’s Movement as a Significant Event 
Independent Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5         Model 6 
1985 Data 
Gender 
Ref: Male 
Female=1 5.425*** 5.583*** 5.682*** 5.682*** 5.662*** 5.666*** 
Region  
Ref: Northcentral 
West 0.342** 0.334** 0.339** 0.339** 0.356* 0.352** 
Northeast 0.500 0.496 0.541 0.541 0.547 0.566 
South 0.509 0.526 0.532 0.532 0.556 0.558 
Race  
Ref: White 
  
Black 1.311 1.335 1.202 1.202 1.207 1.218 
Hispanic 3.213 3.210 2.944 2.944 3.102 2.757 
Asian 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Indian 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Educational Level   (1-5)    ---- 1.149 1.100 1.100 1.064 1.070 
Age     ----    ---- 0.982    ----    ----    ---- 
Cohort     ----    ----    ---- 1.018    ----    ---- 
Cohort Groups (17-
25) 
Ref: During Critical 
Period 
Below    ----    ----    ----    ---- 0.679    ---- 
Above     ----    ----    ----    ---- 0.359**    ---- 
Cohort Groups (12-
29) 
Ref: During Critical 
Period 
Below    ----    ----    ----    ----    ---- 0.665 
Above    ----    ----    ----    ----    ---- 0.395** 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
 
 
Gender 
Ref: Male 
Female 3.456*** 3.526*** 3.485*** 3.486*** 3.468*** 3.489*** 
Region  West 0.631 0.591 0.587 0.586 0.585 0.584 
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2000-2001 Data Ref: Northcentral Northeast 0.685 0.649 0.581 0.581 0.578 0.582 
South 0.410** 0.405** 0.401** 0.401** 0.403** 0.404** 
Race  
Ref: White 
Black 2.267** 2.372** 2.369** 2.359** 2.435** 2.392** 
Hispanic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asian 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Indian 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Educational Level   (1-5)    ---- 1.271* 1.268* 1.267* 1.282* 1.280* 
Age     ----    ---- 0.994    ----    ----    ---- 
Cohort     ----    ----    ---- 1.007    ----    ---- 
Cohort Groups (17-
25) 
Ref: During Critical 
Period 
Below    ----    ----    ----    ---- 1.437    ---- 
Above    ----    ----    ----    ---- 1.274    ---- 
Cohort Groups (12-
29) 
Ref: During Critical 
Period 
Below    ----    ----    ----    ----    ---- 1.579 
Above    ----    ----    ----    ----    ---- 1.187 
Coefficients are standardized 
* p<0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p<.001 (two-tailed test) 
Source: Schuman and Rodgers, 2004 
 
DISCUSSION 
Memory is indeed a complicated process, and it is unrealistic to expect to find a perfect 
formula for how memories are created and given value relative to other remembered events; 
however, the patterns in this study do reveal some insights to what factors affect memory 
formation, and perhaps more interestingly, how these factors change over time. 
The Influence of Age and Education 
 Throughout these regressions, specific variables emerge as having stronger influences on 
who was more likely to recall the Women’s Movement. The fact that the individual relationships 
between each independent variable and the likelihood of recalling the Women’s Movement did 
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not change greatly when other variables were introduced indicates that each of these variables 
operated relatively independently from one another and there were no spurious relationships.  
 Despite findings by previous studies (Schuman and Scott 1985; Schuman and Rodgers 
2004; Corning 2010), neither age nor birth year were significant for either the 1985 and 2000-
2001 surveys when studying the group who recalled the Women’s Movement as one of their two 
significant events. When respondents were grouped into “before,” “during,” and “after” 
Mannheim’s critical period, some clearer relationships did emerge, especially in the 1985 data. 
However, these results only indicate that if a respondent was above the ages of 25-29, they were 
less likely to recall the event as compared to those during Mannheim’s critical period. Even with 
this significant relationship, age in any form was far less important that one may have initially 
suspected, based on the previous literature. This may have occurred because of the nature of 
social movements. Previous events analyzed by Schuman and Scott (1985) and Schuman and 
Rodgers (2004) tended to focus on events that occurred at a particular moment or on a specific 
day, such as the JFK assassination. Social movements, however, have no clear start and stop 
date, and are more tied to longer time periods than moments. Therefore, events such as social 
movements may be less likely to imprint themselves at a specific moment in time, and as such, 
be less tied to age if/when it is recalled later. 
While Schuman and Scott (1985) found that educational level had very little importance 
in terms of who recalled the events that they studied, results from this study show the 
significance of education increased between the two surveys. In 1985, the survey results 
indicated that there was no significant relationship between the educational level of the 
respondent and whether or not the person was likely to recall the Women’s Movement as one of 
their significant events; however, in 2000-2001, results showed that the more educated a person 
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was, the more likely the person was to recall the Women’s Movement. This change in the 
significance of education could be a result of the changing cultural framing of the Women’s 
Movement itself, as Women Studies courses have increased in number in recent decades, and the 
Women’s Movement may be becoming more of a topic of academic discourse. This could also 
potentially be reflective of the Women’s Movement’s general shift to historical knowledge as the 
chronological distance from the event increases. That is to say, as the event becomes a part of 
history classes, education increasingly influences who knows about it. 
The Changing Population Recalling the Women’s Movement 
 Especially interesting in these results are how the influence of different factors change 
over time, in that they indicate that the process of memory formation is dynamic. In 1985, results 
seemed to indicate that those who recalled the Women’s Movement as the most important event 
seemed to be those who were more likely to have been involved in the Movement itself. It was 
only in 1985 that cohort groups had any relationship, as those who were in Mannheim’s critical 
period during the Women’s Movement were the most likely to recall the Movement as one of the 
most important events. Additionally, an indication that memories of the Women’s Movement in 
1985 were based more on participation or involvement was that education had no significant 
relationship. This indicates that knowledge was gained in a way other than education, which 
could be experience. 
 It is the change from 1985 to 2000-2001 that indicates some interesting patterns in the 
process of memory formation regarding the Women’s Movement. Whereas education did not 
have a significant relationship in 1985, it was significant at p<0.10 in 2000-2001, and showed 
that people with higher educational levels were more likely to recall the Women’s Movement as 
significant. This, combined with the fact that age in any form had no significant relationship in 
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the later survey indicates that memories of the Women’s Movement have been shifting from the 
realm of experiential memories to the realm of historical knowledge.  
CONCLUSION 
 It is clear memory is indeed a complicated and dynamic process, and there is no clear 
formula to infallibly calculate which events will be recalled as significant; however, the fact that 
trends do emerge from the demographic data indicates that there is indeed a social component to 
the process of memory formation, and that memory is not an entirely individual process.  
 This study leads to insights regarding the process of memory formation of social 
movements, and more so, the dynamic nature of the process of memory formation. While 
previous quantitative memory studies often focus only on the influence of age at one moment in 
time, my findings indicate that as chronological distance from the event increases, experiential 
factors such as the age in which the person experienced the event decrease in importance. 
Meanwhile, factors such as the educational level of the respondent increase in importance. That 
is to say, throughout time, the formation of memories of specific events depends less on who 
experienced the event, and more on who has more historical knowledge. If memory were only 
influenced by the age of the person at the time of the event, there would not be these 
relationships. Together, this indicates that memory formation is a process that changes over time 
as different generations engage, consume, and interpret the past. 
 We often assume that the past (and our relationship to it) is static.  One cannot change 
what happened in the past. However, although the past itself doesn’t change, these results 
indicate that the way society interacts with the past does change. While there is not a clear 
formula for the creation of memory, an understanding of the significant factors and processes at 
work in memory formation is critical, because our understanding of the past affects the view of 
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the present as well as personal and national identity. Understanding the way memories are 
created by generations that experienced the event and generations following the event can lead to 
more effective strategies for addressing the past. In a more dystopian way, an awareness of how 
memories are perceived, formed, and re-formed can make one more aware of attempts to 
manipulate or manage these collective memories. This knowledge can impact the way we 
approach the future in terms of the way events are discussed and narratives are socially 
constructed. 
 While this study did uncover some interesting aspects to the process of memory 
formation, future research could expand on this study. This dataset was useful in that it allowed 
the respondents to freely recall events rather than choosing from a list of events (thus functioning 
as a more valid simulation of the memory process); however, future studies can and should 
include a larger variety of demographic factors, to include more independent variables in the 
analysis. Because the dataset I used focused more on the importance of age in memory 
formation, it did not include a large range of potential independent variables. For example, in 
future replications of this survey method, it may be insightful to include political orientation and 
income as independent variables in order to examine if it has an impact on who is more or less 
likely to recall the specific event. Inclusion of more independent variables would allow for an 
even more nuanced understanding of what factors influence the social negotiation of memories 
of social movements as well as events in general. Future qualitative studies could continue to 
research acts of commemoration and the media presentation of the Women’s Movement for a 
more nuanced understanding of how generations that did not experience it firsthand interact and 
engage with the Women’s Movement through time. 
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Appendix 1: Coding of Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
Name of 
Variable 
Description of 
Variable 
Independent 
or Dependent 
Coding Dummy Coding 
Women’s 
Movement 
Records whether the 
respondent recalled the 
Women’s Movement 
as one of their two 
significant events. 
Dependent 0 (did not recall) 
1 (did recall) 
N/A 
Survey Year Records whether the 
result was a part of the 
1985 data or the 2000-
2001 data. 
Independent 
Variable 
(each 
regression is 
split by this 
variable) 
0 (1985) 
1 (2000-2001) 
N/A 
 
 
Cohort Records the birth year 
of the respondent. 
Independent 
Variable 
Continuous 
Value 
N/A 
Age Records the age of the 
respondent at the time 
of the completion of 
the survey. 
Independent 
Variable 
Continuous 
Value 
N/A 
Mannheim’s 
Critical Period 
(17-25) 
Records the age of the 
respondent in the year 
1970 (the midpoint of 
the Women’s 
Movement). This scale 
variable was then 
broken down into 
groups of “before,” 
“during,” and “after” 
Mannheim’s critical 
period (ages 17-25) 
Independent 
Variable 
1 (Before 
Mannheim’s 
Critical Period) 
2 (During 
Mannheim’s 
Critical Period) 
3 (After 
Mannheim’s 
Critical Period) 
agewomen17_before 
1 (before Critical Period) 
0 (all else) 
agewomen17_after 
1 (after Critical Period) 
0 (all else) 
 
Reference Group: 
during Critical period 
Mannheim’s 
Critical Period 
(12-29) 
Records the age of the 
respondent in the year 
1970 (the midpoint of 
the Women’s 
Movement). This scale 
variable was then 
broken down into 
groups of “before,” 
“during,” and “after” 
an extended form of 
Mannheim’s critical 
period (ages 12-29) as 
had been done in 
previous surveys 
Independent 
Variable 
1 (Before 
Mannheim’s 
Critical period) 
2 (During 
Mannheim’s 
Critical Period) 
3 (After 
Mannheim’s 
Critical Period) 
agewomen12_29_before 
1 (before Critical Period) 
0 (all else) 
agewomen12_29after 
1 (after Critical Period) 
0 (all else) 
 
 
 
Reference Group: 
during Critical period 
Gender  Records the gender of 
the respondent. 
Independent 
Variable 
0 (Male) 
1 (Female) 
N/A 
Region Records the region of 
the United States 
where the respondent 
identifies as living. 
Independent 
Variable 
1 (West) 
2 (Northcentral) 
3 (Northeast) 
4 (South) 
west2 
1 (west) 
0 (all else) 
northeast2 
1 (northeast) 
0 (all else) 
south2 
1 (south) 
0 (all else) 
Reference Group:  
Northcentral 
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Educational 
Level 
 
Records the 
educational level of 
the respondent in 
terms of years. 
Independent 
Variable 
1 (0 to 11) 
2 (12) 
3 (13-15) 
4 (16) 
5 (17+) 
N/A 
Race 
 
Records the race of the 
respondent, grouping 
them into five 
different categories. 
Independent 
Variable 
1 (white) 
2 (black) 
3 (Hispanic) 
4 (Indian) 
5 (Asian) 
black 
1 (black) 
0 (all else) 
hispanic 
1 (Hispanic) 
0 (all else) 
indian 
1 (Indian) 
0 (all else) 
asian 
1 (Asian) 
0 (all else) 
 
Reference Group: White 
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Appendix 2: Univariate Analysis of Variables 
Total N-Size: 5,294 
N-Size (with no missing values in any variables): 5,082  
Variable Number of 
Missing 
Category Frequency 
Survey 0 1985 
2000-2001 
1,410 
3,884 
Women’s Movement 0 Did Recall as 
Significant 
Did Not Recall as 
Significant 
88 
5,206 
Gender 2 Women 
Men 
2,937 
2,355 
Region 0 West 
Northcentral 
Northeast 
South 
1,127 
1,385 
988 
1,794 
Education Level 54 0 to 11 years 
12 years 
13-15 years 
16 years 
17+ years 
573 
1,590 
1,534 
833 
710 
Race 140 White 
Black 
Hispanic 
Indian 
Asian 
4,251 
465 
280 
71 
87 
Variable Number of 
Missing 
Minimum Maximum 
Cohort 48 1,888 1,983 
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THE GROWING ACHIEVEMENT GAP 
In 1837, Horace Mann, the well-known politician and advocate for education reform, 
argued that public schools must be institutions in which “the children of all classes, rich and 
poor, should partake as equally as possible in the privileges” (Kahlenberg 2012: 2) available. 
Mann’s call for equitable education persists as reformers continue to debate the most efficient 
and effective ways to improve outcomes for students of all socioeconomic backgrounds, 
particularly for low-income children. As the achievement gap between students of differing 
socioeconomic status (SES) grows, controversy persists. Given the decentralized state of the U.S. 
education system, there have been many opportunities to experiment with potentially successful 
education tools.  
 One proposal to achieve this end that has gained attention in recent decades is that of 
socioeconomic integration, or the placement of “low-income students in middle-class schools (in 
which less than 50 percent of students are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch)” (Kahlenberg 
2012: 3). This movement is based on the observation that the socioeconomic composition of 
schools is the most important factor in determining student achievement and attainment 
outcomes (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013; Perry and McConney 2010).  Proponents of 
encouraging the placement of low-SES students into middle-class schools assert that this strategy 
is effective because it increases positive peer influences, surrounds students with a community of 
engaged parents, and exposes students to strong teachers (Kahlenberg 2012; Kainz and Pan 
2014; Orfield, Kucsera, and Siegel-Hawley 2012).  
  The research is abundantly clear that socioeconomic integration has significant benefits 
for lower-income students. However, critics of socioeconomic integration plans argue that such 
plans often overlook three things: (1) reduced rates of achievement for middle-SES students 
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(Montt 2016); (2) increased parent concerns for student outcomes (Hannah-Jones 2016); and (3) 
an increased risk of negative psychosocial consequences among low-SES students due to 
increased competition (Crosnoe 2009). Consequently, opposing politicians, parents, and 
education experts argue that such plans are not effective in enhancing outcomes for all students.  
This review draws on the works of leading experts in education reform and research to 
better understand the current discussion on socioeconomic integration in schools. By raising and 
responding to several key counter arguments, it will show that when schools and classrooms are 
more strategically integrated, socioeconomic integration plans are an effective tool to improve 
student outcomes. When this stipulation is met, adolescents of all socioeconomic backgrounds 
are better prepared to successfully navigate challenges they encounter in their academic, social, 
and professional lives.   
THE RISE OF SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION PLANS 
 The notion of integrating students of differing SES within schools is deeply rooted in 
American history, though its origins are more racial than economic. In 1954, in Brown vs. Board 
of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed racially segregated schooling unconstitutional. 
Today it is widely acknowledged that race and SES are closely intertwined and often pattern one 
another (Williams, Priest, and Anderson 2016; Potter, Quick, and Davies 2016), as minority 
populations often face high rates of poverty (Williams 2016; Orfield 2012; Potter 2016). For this 
reason, race and class are often used interchangeably or jointly in the conversation on 
integration. As populations continued to self-segregate, experts noted that the elimination of de 
jure segregation alone would not suffice to improve outcomes for all students (Kahlenberg 2012; 
Potter 2016; Center for American Progress 2005). Subsequently, the 1966 landmark Coleman 
Report brought the concept of socioeconomic integration into the spotlight. This report, which 
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looked at 600,000 students enrolled in 4,000 schools, is considered one of the most significant 
studies conducted in the history of education reform. It concluded that “the [socioeconomic] 
composition of the student body is more highly related to achievement, independent of [a] 
student’s own social background, than is any school factor” (Kahlenberg 2012: 2). In 1997, a 
congressionally authorized study of 40,000 students similarly concluded: “as the poverty level of 
the school goes up, the average achievement level goes down” (Kahlenberg, 2012: 4). These 
findings have been repeatedly observed in various other studies over the past five decades (Potter 
2016; Hair et al. 2015; Lacour and Tissington 2011; Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues 2011). 
Affluent parents and conservative politicians rarely support socioeconomic integration plans. 
Nevertheless, experts agree that poverty is a root cause for reduced student success, and this 
drives the continued push for socioeconomic integration plans.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Argument for Socioeconomic Integration Reform 
Education experts have identified three major drivers for how socioeconomic integration 
effectively improves outcomes for low-SES students. First, integrated schools create an 
environment where low-income students have the opportunity to learn alongside their middle-
class peers, who tend to be more academically engaged and are less likely to experience 
behavioral problems than students in lower-income schools (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013). 
Second, they benefit from a community of parents who are more actively engaged in school 
affairs and are able to hold school officials accountable (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013). 
Finally, low-SES students benefit from stronger and more experienced teachers who have higher 
expectations for their students (Kahlenberg 2012; Kainz 2014; Rumberger and Palardy).  
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Richard D. Kahlenberg summarizes these findings and cites several studies to 
substantiate his claims. A 2006 report published by the Center for American Progress examined 
data from 22,000 schools enrolling 18 million students to determine the effects of racial and 
socioeconomic integration on achievement. The study concluded that “minority students have 
greater gains in racially integrated schools, and that a substantial portion of the racial 
composition effect is really due to poverty and peer achievement” (Kahlenberg 2012: 4). 
Champions of socioeconomic integration plans highlight the importance of altering the context in 
which adolescents learn (Potter 2016). This change in context lends itself not only to an increase 
in access to resources, but also to a considerable increase in positive peer and adult influences 
within schools (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013; Rumberger 2005).  
While low-income students experience substantial growth in academic achievement, 
middle-class students also benefit from learning in integrated schools. Kahlenberg asserts that as 
long as middle-class students hold the “numerical majority” or make up between fifty and 
seventy percent of the school population, they continue to thrive in socioeconomically integrated 
schools (Kahlenberg 2012: 5). As many universities and companies agree, the benefits extend to 
all students, and without such exposures and interactions, they are ill equipped to thrive in a 
“multicultural society” (Kahlenberg 2012: 10; Wells, Fox, and Cordova-Coba 2016). Students in 
socioeconomically homogenous schools miss out on opportunities to further develop critical 
thinking skills, empathy, and a sense of civic engagement that is essential in today’s diversifying 
workforce and globalizing economy (Potter 2016; Kamenetz 2015). In light of the current body 
of research, many education experts agree there is a need for education reform that benefits 
children of all socioeconomic classes rather than only those who can readily access the highest 
quality resources.   
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THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION REFORM 
Reduced Achievement Among Middle- and High-SES Students  
 In spite of evidence demonstrating the benefits of socioeconomic integration plans, 
opponents note that advantaged students, or those of middle and high-SES, do not necessarily see 
gains at the same rate as disadvantaged, or low-SES students. Dr. Guillermo Montt addresses this 
concern as he defines effectively integrated schools as those that can promote disadvantaged 
students’ outcomes while ensuring that advantaged students do not experience any simultaneous 
losses (Montt 2016: 808). He concludes that such schools are “elusive” (Montt 2016: 808), but 
also notes that integration plans have a greater propensity for effectiveness in certain situational 
contexts, and larger schools and classrooms seem to favor success for all students (Montt 2016: 
818; Rumberger 2005: 2015). Such classroom settings allow increased interactions with more 
diverse students (Montt 2016: 818). Additionally, large schools often experience the added 
benefit of attracting better resources, such as for extracurricular activities that allow students to 
engage socially (Montt 2016: 823; Harris 2010: 1169).  
Though Montt credits the growing body of research showing the direct and indirect 
benefits imparted to disadvantaged students in socioeconomically diversified classrooms, he 
explains that advantaged students in the same environment “show lower levels of achievement” 
(Montt 2016: 809). Montt found that disadvantaged students in integrated schools score 
approximately “25 points higher in reading” (Montt 2016: 817) compared to their counterparts in 
schools that have a high density of low-income students. Contrarily, advantaged students score 
“over 25 points lower” (Montt 2016: 817) in integrated schools than their respective counterparts 
in schools that are comprised primarily of middle and high-SES students. This score reduction 
can be compared to missing 35% of one year of school instruction (Montt 2016: 817). 
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Rumberger found similar results following a series of simulations that “estimated achievement 
growth over 4 years of high school for disadvantaged, average, and advantaged white and black 
students in low-, middle-, and high-SES high schools” (Rumberger 2005: 2019). Under the 
assumption that all high- and low- schools became socioeconomically integrated, the gains 
experienced by disadvantaged students moving to middle-SES schools would be less than the 
losses experienced by advantaged students moving to middle-SES schools (Rumberger 2005: 
2019). These findings indicate that although the achievement gap between disadvantaged and 
advantaged students would be reduced following socioeconomic integration of students, overall 
achievement would also decline (Rumberger 2005: 2020). Given the possible academic losses 
for many middle and high-SES students, in addition to concerns for negative life outcomes, there 
is strong political and community resistance towards integration plans arguing against their 
effectiveness for all students.  
Psychosocial Consequences Among Disadvantaged Students   
 As researchers and parents find reduced rates of achievement among advantaged students 
in integrated schools alarming, other opponents raise concerns for the unintended consequences 
of socioeconomic integration plans for disadvantaged students. Dr. Robert Crosnoe highlights 
potential risks by analyzing data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health 
through the “frog pond” perspective, which asserts that “students evaluate themselves relative to 
those in their specific context” (Crosnoe 2009: 3; Marsh 2003). In other words, students are 
inclined towards comparing themselves to their peers, and this may have negative psychosocial 
effects in the case of disadvantaged students comparing themselves to more socioeconomically 
advantaged students. Because SES is commonly used as a “marker of academic ability (and 
social worth)” (Crosnoe 2009: 15), students of low-SES are subject to a “greater competitive 
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disadvantage (Crosnoe 2009: 15)” when evaluated by their peers, faculty, and parental 
communities (Kelly 2009).  
Students in integrated schools are positioned to compete for social capital and other 
indicators of academic success, such as grades and course offerings (Crosnoe 2009: 3). This 
competition often manifests in the form of tracking, which refers to the practice of placing 
students on educational paths of varying difficulty based on their academic performance in 
previous years (Mathis 2013). Tracking has developed into a modern-day mechanism of 
segregation. This is evident in looking at data on national high school enrollment during the 
2011-2012 school year. While minority students comprised 37% of enrollment nationwide, they 
only comprised 20% of students taking advanced math courses (Kohli 2014). Decisions about 
tracking are based not only on objective factors, such as test scores and grades, but also on 
subjective factors, including teacher and guidance counselor recommendations, parent insistence, 
and student desires (Kelly 2009: 50; Kohli 2014). This final subjective factor warrants further 
discussion. Disadvantaged students in schools with a larger proportion of advantaged students 
may be resistant towards joining honors and Advanced Placement courses, for they can lead to 
feelings of social isolation (Kelly 2009: 51). To evade feelings of discomfort, such students are 
more inclined to stay with their similarly disadvantaged peers in lower-track courses (Kelly 
2009: 51).  
 Crosnoe explains that this de facto segregation puts low-income students at greater “risk 
for stigmatization (Crosnoe 2009: 4)” and for reduced gains in achievement when in high-SES 
schools than when in low-SES schools. Not only do these risks have implications for “status 
attainment, health, and well-being (Crosnoe 2009: 4)” later in life, but they also hinder prospects 
for advancement to college and employment (Crosnoe 2009: 3; Kohli 2014). These hidden risks 
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may undermine the many achievement benefits to low-SES students associated with 
socioeconomic integration plans. 
DISCUSSION 
Addressing Key Concerns    
Benefits for all students, regardless of SES   
 Montt’s and Rumberger’s findings are problematic for many affluent parents, few of 
whom would be willing to send their children to a school knowing the considerable risk of 
reduced academic achievement. Their findings highlight a critical flaw in the push for 
socioeconomic integration plans: The overall reduction in the achievement gap between 
advantaged and disadvantaged students does not necessarily demonstrate effectiveness if some 
students experience losses for the sake of improving outcomes for others. This is a valid 
argument, one that must be further substantiated by replicated results, but it is essential to realize 
that these are singular studies that have assessed academic achievement gains of middle and 
high-SES students.  
Additional studies have sought to elucidate if advantaged students in integrated schools 
truly do see worse outcomes than in more advantaged schools. Contrary to Montt’s and 
Rumberger’s findings, the National Center of Educational Statistics concluded in a 2015 report 
that “white student achievement in schools with the highest black student density did not differ 
from white student achievement in schools with the lowest density” (U.S. Department of 
Education 2015: 1). Though this report focused primarily on achievement by race, it is important 
to remember the interconnected nature of race and socioeconomic status.  
Though the effects of attending socioeconomically integrated schools may be “weaker for 
advantaged students” (Montt 2016: 818; Rumberger 2005: 2007) in some instances, education 
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experts argue the importance of examining additional markers of success when assessing the 
effectiveness of integration plans for all students. 
Affluent parents voice concerns for smaller increases in test scores by protesting 
socioeconomic integration plans, yet mounting research suggests that test scores are limited in 
their ability to comprehensively define academic success (Hiss and Franks 2014; Hoffman and 
Lowitzki 2005; Beatty, Greenwood, and Linn 1999).  Education experts highlight how all 
adolescents experience cognitive and non-cognitive benefits in socioeconomically integrated 
schools. For example, white students are inclined to work both “harder and smarter (Kamenetz 
2015: 3)” and are likely to be “more empathetic and less prejudiced (Kamenetz 2015: 3)” when 
in diverse classrooms as a result of forming friendships with students of other racial and 
socioeconomic backgrounds. These friendships lend themselves to greater cross-racial 
understanding and social cohesion (Spencer and Reno 2009: 9).  
Katherine Philips exemplifies these findings as she compares how groups of all white and 
mixed race students address a murder mystery. The results show that the more diverse student 
groups have a greater tendency to work harder, focus more, and expand their thinking. As a 
result, they are more likely to come to the correct answers (Kamenetz 2015: 3).  Research put 
forth by The Century Foundation explains these findings by saying that students learning in such 
diverse environments benefit from greater “cognitive stimulation” (Wells 2016: 9). These 
findings challenge both parents and researchers, such as Montt and Rumberger, to look outside 
of standardized test scores when assessing student achievement. Evidence indicates that students 
in socioeconomically integrated schools experience considerable gains in work ethic, emotional 
intelligence, and critical thinking, all of which confer practical benefits for students in school and 
beyond.  
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Achievement and attainment beyond the classroom   
 Parents often worry for the future life outcomes of their children in integrated schools; 
however, more focus should be placed on the advice coming from the institutions where parents 
hope their children will one day study or work. Dr. Amy Stuart Wells supports Kahlenberg’s 
findings on the benefits of socioeconomic integration and explains that many universities and 
employers, including 50% of Fortune 100 companies, assert that their employees must exhibit 
capacities such as those noted by Kamenetz in order to succeed (Wells 2016; Spencer 2009). 
Nevertheless, many affluent parents and politicians continue to question integration policies 
given the apparent disconnect between approaches taken by universities and K-12 education 
systems. Due to a lack of policy reform and research in these sectors, student outcomes are 
primarily measured by test scores and graduation rates rather than by the experiences derived 
from diverse learning environments (Wells 2016: 6). Consequently, teachers are more focused on 
gearing students towards college entrance rather than on equipping them with the skills they will 
need to thrive in college and beyond. As skills gained from such diverse learning experiences are 
less tangible and more difficult to quantify than test scores, integration plans remain a hard sell 
to parents and politicians that influence education reform. To bolster this argument, decision-
makers should note how integration plans would not only benefit students in the long run, but 
also the general population. 
Societal benefits of socioeconomic integration in schools   
 While many education experts agree that students of all socioeconomic backgrounds 
benefit academically, socially, and professionally from learning in integrated classrooms, 
benefits extend to society as a whole as well. The Metropolitan Planning Council is a Chicago-
based non-profit that aims to address challenges in regional development. In a recent report, the 
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organization estimated the tangible benefits of integration in the Chicago region. The study 
highlights advantages such an average increase in African-American earnings by nearly $3,000 
annually, an $8 billion increase in Chicago’s GDP, a 30% reduction in the homicide rate, a $6 
billion increase in residential real estate values, and an additional 83,000 college graduates 
increasing regional earnings by $90 billion (Chiles 2017: 3). Integrated communities also benefit 
from reduced residential segregation, better quality schools, and a diversified workforce 
(Spencer 2009: 9). With these gains, it is evident that integration not only benefits low-income 
minority populations, but also benefits higher-income white populations who may not recognize 
the larger economic and social ramifications of segregating practices.  
Psychosocial benefits for adolescents living in poverty   
 Scientists agree that removing adolescents from poverty to improve cognitive function is 
ideal, yet not all agree that placing them in integrated schools yields better outcomes than further 
investment in high-poverty schools. Crosnoe complicates Kahlenberg’s research by exposing 
that policy proposals favoring socioeconomic integration plans often overlook the risks of 
unintended psychosocial consequences to lower-SES students. An understanding of the effects of 
poverty on the adolescent brain reveals that socioeconomically diverse learning environments 
can mitigate these risks. Economic Mobility Pathways, a Boston non-profit that strives to 
improve the economic self-sufficiency of families, explains how the “ever-present stress” 
associated with poverty can overwhelm the brain (Mathewson 2017). Results of their recent 
study demonstrate that when the limbic system, the emotion processing center of the brain, is 
overwhelmed with fear and stress, it communicates these messages to the pre-frontal cortex, 
which is in charge of executive function (Mathewson 2017). In consequence, individual ability to 
efficiently “solve problems, set goals, and complete tasks” is inhibited (Mathewson, 2017). This 
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finding suggests the positive affect of removing low-SES adolescents from the constant stress of 
poverty and placing them in socioeconomically integrated schools. Research on the dramatic role 
of peer influences, such as that conducted by Kahlenberg and Dr. Linda Spearindicates that 
investing resources is not sufficient to mitigate the effects of poverty and that a true change in 
the social context of schools is necessary to improve student success (Spear 2012: 10-11; 
Kahlenberg 2012: 5). 
Social integration as the key to successful socioeconomic integration   
 Research on adolescent brain function and behavior provides a lens through which we 
may draw a new conclusion: although socioeconomic integration plans have the potential to be 
successful, they operate under the assumption that students are adequately socially integrated 
within socioeconomically integrated schools. This is not always the case, as Montt’s and 
Crosnoe’s findings suggest. Both Kahlenberg’s and Crosnoe’s perspectives may be employed 
together to drive a compromise that better addresses the drastic achievement gap between 
students of differing SES. Kahlenberg, Crosnoe, and Montt cite research pointing to the fact that 
“students can be segregated within schools as well as from them” (Kahlenberg 2012: 12; Montt 
2016; Crosnoe 2009). This pitfall implies that more must be done to alter the learning context.  
As Kahlenberg urges reformers to ensure that “integrated school buildings are not 
resegregated by classroom” (Kahlenberg 2012: 12), Crosnoe and Montt delve deeper into the 
issue. Both offer convincing arguments as they show that socioeconomic integration plans can be 
improved by ensuring opportunities for social integration, including the elimination of tracking 
and the expansion of extracurricular activities (Crosnoe 2009: 15; Montt 2016: 823). Such 
initiatives are compelling, as they aim to moderate the hidden risks of socioeconomic 
integrations plans. Neuropsychologists agree that these extensions of current plans would create 
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less stressful environments that enhance performance since they “reduce status hierarchies” 
(Crosnoe 2009: 16) and boost feelings of “social belongingness” (Crosnoe 2009: 13). Crosnoe’s 
and Montt’s critique of current plans in light of research on adolescent emotionality and 
cognition suggests a need for improved implementation plans to maximize student outcomes.   
Remaining Political and Social Concerns  
 Conservatives and liberals, who generally oppose and favor socioeconomic integration 
plans respectively, both continue to show resistance. In a personal interview, Paul Kihn 
underscores the key influence of the political climate when implementing socioeconomic 
integration plans and notes that even if parents did buy into the perceived gains, there are other 
barriers to consider further (2017). Among them, he emphasizes that of parent choice when 
buying homes to gain access to particular school districts (Kihn 2017). In other debate, Nikole 
Hannah-Jones spotlights minority parent concerns for the marginalization of their children in 
minority-majority classrooms (2016). The concerns of both minority and majority parents are 
valid; however, research indicates that if schools can develop strategies to bypass potential 
pitfalls of unequal achievement gains and increased negative psychosocial consequences while 
also facilitating social interaction, many of the fears that parents voice would be addressed.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 A peak into history shows clearly that socioeconomic and racial segregation hinders 
opportunities for everyone. In response, education reformers should focus efforts on advocating 
for and implementing effective socioeconomic integration plans to reduce the socioeconomic 
achievement gap. Socioeconomic integration plans have gained weight in the past several 
decades as evidence highlights their ability to confer cognitive and non-cognitive benefits to 
students of all socioeconomic backgrounds. Large political resistance from racial majority 
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affluent parents persists as they argue that socioeconomically advantaged students do not 
experience the same rates of academic achievement in integrated schools as they would in more 
advantaged schools.  
Parents from the other side of the socioeconomic spectrum raise concerns about negative 
psychosocial consequences. Leading experts in education, however, contend that these fears are 
unwarranted given the research showing that students in strategically integrated schools are 
better equipped with the skills deemed necessary to thrive by numerous universities and 
employers. Socioeconomic integration plans are effective in improving outcomes for students of 
all SES, but only when education reformers and schools ensure that social integration is a key 
component of program implementation. Given the current education climate, advocates of 
socioeconomic integration must increase their efforts to not only address the potential risks to 
students of all SES, but to also tackle the inevitable challenges of political dissent, feasibility, 
and implementation. 
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 The ongoing economic uncertainty in the European Union (EU), the unprecedented influx 
of immigrants and refugees, and the growing threat of terrorism, have raised questions about the 
long-term legitimacy, stability, and resilience of the EU. Little has been done by the EU 
administration to successfully address doubts in the hearts of its citizens. Can the EU 
administration turn things around for Europe? Does the EU administration have the power, the 
drive, and the resources to restore its citizens’ faith in the institution’s ability to address Europe’s 
problems, and if so how would they go about doing that? 
 In 1958, following the Second World War, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
was formed in the hopes of peacefully bringing Western European countries together. Six 
nations, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, were the first to 
join the EEC, hoping to foster economic cooperation, minimize conflict between European 
nations, and encourage democracy in member states. The EEC quickly grew and evolved to be a 
unique and powerful economic and political union that now addresses policy areas ranging from 
human rights, the environment, security, climate change, and external relations with non-EU 
nations (European Union 2016). With its core values based in the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and a fundamental purpose of fostering, promoting, and reinforcing social, political 
and economic harmony amongst European nations, the organization was officially renamed the 
European Union (EU) in 1993. As of 2015, the EU was comprised of 28 member states, covering 
over 4 million square kilometers (~ 1.5 million square miles) and protecting the rights of 
approximately 508 million inhabitants (European Union 2016). To this day, these core values of 
human rights, democracy, and rule of law remain the EU’s driving force, the root of its success 
and the challenge it continues to face to this day. 
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It is in this historical context that my research on citizens’ confidence in the EU, 
particularly in its political legitimacy, is located. With the rise in terrorism and immigration and 
the lingering effects of the economic crises in Member States, understanding citizens’ faith in the 
EU administration is important now more than ever to ensure the successful and stable future of 
the institution. It is also important to recognize that EU citizens’ confidence is dependent on their 
location on the political, social, and economic hierarchy. The political and economic elites, 
arguably the ones who benefit the most from the work and policies of the EU, are likely to have a 
more positive view of the EU than the average citizen who has fallen through the cracks and 
whose needs are not addressed by political leaders. Part of why the British, for example, voted to 
leave the EU was because they felt that only the EU elitists, defined in this paper as the “political 
elite”, who ran the EU benefitted (Robertson 2016; Frum 2016). So, whose European Union is 
it? Does it belong to the political elites or the average citizen? 
 To address these questions, confidence of citizens in the EU and its political legitimacy 
were examined through a dual lens, that of the political elites versus the average citizen. The 
formal research question posed was, “how do informed EU citizenry and economic health impact 
their confidence in the European Union?” On the one hand, confidence could be all about how 
knowledgeable the average citizen is about the EU, its policies, and the organization’s 
responsibilities to the citizens and how that knowledge might benefit them. The more working 
EU knowledge the average citizen has (Informed Citizenry), the more likely they will endorse 
the political legitimacy of the EU and view its future positively, more so than the citizens’ 
economic health (Hypothesis 1). On the other hand, one could argue that it is about one’s stake 
in how strong and stable the economic health of the EU, irrespective of knowledge. In other 
words, it would not matter how informed citizens are, but it would be the politically and 
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economically healthier citizens, defined in this research as the political elites, that ultimately 
dominate the workings and future of the European Union. Economic health of citizens and 
nations therefore, could have stronger impact on citizens’ EU confidence than Informed 
Citizenry (Hypothesis 2). 
 Knowledgeable citizens are vital for democracy to function properly; they are the voices 
that can drive changes in their lives to protect their rights, and liberties. If citizens are not 
informed adequately about the purpose of an institution and its policies, they will be unable to be 
engaged in a way that is truly representative of their needs and expectations. Because the 
European Union deals with not only economics, but also issues of justice, migration, 
environment, and human rights, it is necessary that citizens know and understand these issues for 
the EU administration to enact changes that will benefit the wider population.  
 In addition to how much working knowledge citizens have of the EU and its policies, 
their quality of life and economic health can also shape their opinions of the Union’s future. 
Even though the EU strives to improve the living standards, human dignity and freedom of all its 
citizens, it is quite likely that the economic and political elites benefit more from the system than 
the average citizen. If the elites are satisfied with their lives and the power that they have within 
society, they may have more faith in the EU and European leadership. In contrast, if the EU and 
its leaders cannot reduce disparities, the less privileged citizens are likely to lose confidence in 
the EU. It is reasonable to assume that those who have not benefitted as much from the system, 
the average citizens, hold the EU responsible for their poor economic health and quality of life. 
The day-to-day experiences and standards of living of citizens are likely to define their 
confidence in the EU. 
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 In short, both informed citizens and political elites have the power to influence EU 
confidence. A comparative assessment of the voices of knowledgeable citizenry and elites will 
be useful to the EU administration as it shapes its future policies. Because the EU is so vast and 
diverse, in terms of the history of its member states and because citizens’ EU confidence can be 
expected to vary by region, analyses needs to be disaggregated by EU regions, as in Western, 
Eastern, and Mediterranean nations. Findings from this study will add to the scholarship of the 
EU’s future as well as the sociology of transnational politics and government. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Scholars of the extant literature reviewed below have focused on the political legitimacy 
of the EU, particularly trust in the EU and how informed citizens were about EU policies. 
Because the European Union is by nature a multilevel governing body that is structurally deeply 
intertwined with national governments, it has been argued that EU citizens who trust their own 
national governments were more likely to extrapolate that trust to other supranational political 
levels. EU scholars also found that citizens’ knowledge about the European Union, its history, 
governing bodies and their respective policies, can influence, both directly and indirectly, 
whether they trust and support the EU. Some researchers have also noted contradictions in the 
way citizens’ quality of life and their economic health shaped faith in the future of the EU. 
The Struggle for EU Legitimacy 
 The struggle for EU legitimacy, both political and economic, is waged in the minds of the 
average citizen as well as its elites. Scholars have found that the political legitimacy and 
authority of the EU as an organization has fluctuated over the years depending on the context and 
environment at the time. Moreover, the Union constantly reshapes itself to better fit the needs of 
the people it serves. The EU’s legitimacy was also measured by whether EU citizens were 
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satisfied with their lives and felt that they were benefitting from being in an EU Member State. 
Other scholars argued that citizens’ confidence in the EU comes down to how well educated and 
knowledgeable citizens were about the EU, its history and its policies. The ways the EU 
administration communicated information regarding the EU and how much knowledge citizens 
had largely influenced what citizens demanded of the organization and if they believed in its 
legitimacy. 
EU Political Legitimacy 
 At the heart of the European Union lays the ambiguous understanding and definition of 
the organization itself, McCormick (2014) argued. He posited that scholars, on the one hand, 
have defined the EU as a form of multi-level governance or consociationalism,
1
 while other 
researchers have left the definition vague, calling it an international organization that oversees 
politics and economics across European nations. McCormick formally defined the EU as an 
international organization that is embedded in an intergovernmental system in which leaders 
from the governments of member states work together and create a singular set of policies, 
currency, market, and trade. The fluid and ambiguous nature of the EU create challenges for 
citizens as well as for the key players and leaders involved to understand and legitimate the 
organization. 
 The struggle for political legitimacy and political trust is a story as old as the European 
Union and European integration itself and only continues to reinforce the vague definitions and 
roles of the EU (Sternberg 2013). Sternberg, in her work on the legitimacy of the European 
Union, asserted that the organization, despite surviving some of the most severe crises to date, is 
                                                 
1
 Consociationalism is “a form of democracy which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a 
state that comprises diverse societies (distinct ethnic, religious, political, national or linguistic 
groups), by allocating these groups collective rights” (Reut Institute 2008). 
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encountering growing skepticism and concern about how trustworthy and legitimate the Union 
itself is.
2
 In fact, the EU citizen’s understanding of legitimacy is much more fluid and 
continuously changing depending on the context at the time. Initially, the EU was created and 
was legitimized by European nations’ unspoken desire and agreement to create and maintain 
peace and prosperity across Europe, to serve the common good of the people. Over time, this 
view of legitimacy became much more about economic integration with goal of creating a 
common market objective. With the Maastricht Treaty
3
, otherwise referred to as the Treaty on 
European Union, the integration discourse evolved to include classic democratic ideals and 
related reforms. Through her detailed study of the historical meaning of EU legitimacy, 
Sternberg argued that European Union leaders continue, to this day, to struggle with formally 
defining and creating legitimacy around the organization, particularly with regards to what the 
EU should and should not be doing and how well the Union is meeting citizen expectations. 
 Other scholars have devoted attention to the shifting understanding of the nature of the 
EU. Beetham and Lord (2013), for example, while acknowledging legitimacy as something 
affiliated to political authority, noted that the EU is constantly changing to fit the needs of the 
organization and the people it serves. They defined legitimacy as a framework used to analyze 
and explain the different types of EU member governments and how and why citizens abide by 
the legal and political laws of organizations like the EU or a national government. Beetham and 
Lord (2013) argued that political legitimacy of the EU and the European political space 
essentially comes down to the interactions, and intrinsic connections, between the EU and its 
member states. To these authors, political authority is only deemed legitimate and recognized if 
it is (a) legal, “acquired and exercised according to established rules”, (b) normative “the rules 
                                                 
2
 Sternberg 2013, 187-192. 
3
 Maastricht negotiations took place in 1992 wherein leaders from various European nations met with the goal and 
intention of creating the first single [European] currency, the Euro, across sovereign nations in the modern world. 
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are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs, and (c) democratically legitimate “positions 
of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation of appropriate subordinates, and 
by recognition from other legitimate authorities” (Beetham and Lord 2013:3).  
 EU political legitimacy has also been approached from the opposing end of the 
legitimacy-illegitimacy spectrum. Scholars, like Rousseau (2014), used a democratic deficit 
model and problems with legitimacy, to explain the failure of the EU to practice and operate in a 
democratic fashion. Rousseau, in his analysis EU’s democratic deficit, found that legitimacy, or 
more pointedly illegitimacies of the EU, came in two primary forms. Input-oriented legitimacy, 
based on the collective identity of the people, the average citizens, is “government by the 
people” (11) while out-put oriented legitimacy is dependent on common interests and goals, a 
“government for the people” (2014:11). In both forms, new forms of decision-making, reliant on 
transparency and public participation, was deemed more popular and legitimate by the average 
citizen than the traditional, behind the scenes, methods of decision-making and discussion 
between business and political leaders with minimal deliberation, benefitting primarily the elites. 
 Political legitimacy is also a matter of trust, with its breadth of meaning and importance 
to all individuals, their nations, and transnational institutions. In the EU political context, 
extrapolation of citizens’ trust in the health of their national institutions to the EU has swung 
both ways. Researchers have empirically documented a positive association between citizens’ 
trust in national institutions and their trust in larger EU organizations. Harteveld (2013) defined 
trust as fundamental to a social system because it diffuses support through all levels of society. 
Political trust is the glue that keeps the political system together and is the “prime expression of 
[political] legitimacy” (Harteveld 2013:543). Using data from the June – July 2009 
Eurobarometer survey 71.3, administered in 30 Member States with approximately 1000 
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respondents per State, Harteveld (2013) found the logic of extrapolation
4
 to be the most 
influential in citizens’ confidence in the EU while the logics of identity5 and rationality6 to have 
little to no impact. Citizens’ confidence in the EU was almost entirely rested on citizens’ trust in 
national institutions, regardless of their rational evaluation or emotional affiliation. The more 
they trusted their national governments, the more likely they were to trust the European Union 
too. 
 A more specific form of extrapolation is how trust in domestic local governments 
translated into trust in supranational political institutions. Arnold, Sparis, and Zapryanova (2012) 
found in their study of trust in EU institutions using 2005 – 2010 Eurobarometer survey data, 
that citizens’ trust in domestic institutions and local governments cultivated greater confidence in 
EU institutions. However, extrapolated trust was conditional to specific countries; domestic 
corruption levels explained away the positive association between trust in national institutions 
and the EU. Besides, when national corruption levels were low, citizens trusted their non-
political and national institutions more than the EU. 
 On the other hand, researchers have also found a negative relationship between citizens’ 
trust in national institutions and the European Union. In Munoz, Torcal, and Bonet’s (2011) 
analyses of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th waves of the European Social Survey (completed in 2004, 2005 
and 2008 in all the then twenty-seven EU member states), trust in the national and European 
parliaments were intrinsically interdependent but also negatively extrapolated. Trust in a national 
institution or the local government created an upper limit standard in the minds of citizens, a 
                                                 
4
 The Logic of Extrapolation: If people were generally optimistic and trusting of things, it is highly predictable that 
they would be trusting of other institutions, people or situations. In short, if citizens trusted their national political 
institutions, they are likely to have faith in the European Union as well. 
5
 The Logic of Identity: Trust arose when citizens were able to identify with the state and its institutions because it 
[trust] is diffused through the community. 
6
 The Logic of Rationality: Confidence is the rational result of citizens’ evaluations of the benefits received from the 
EU or other political institutions, more specifically aspects that served their personal interest or that they personally 
benefitted from. 
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standard they used to evaluate the EU and its institutions. In other words, the more citizens 
trusted their local government and institutions, the less confidence they had in the EU. But, when 
citizens had little trust in their national institutions, they tended to have more confidence in EU 
institutions. 
Economic Legitimacy of Institutions and Citizens  
 The collective and individual quality of life of EU citizens has been another influential 
dimension of the EU’s legitimacy and citizen confidence in the EU. The Euro deficit, the rise in 
terror and crisis of legitimacy, and political ideologies, amongst other things, led the EU 
parliament and the EU to introduce a variety of economic reforms in the hopes of increasing 
citizen support and legitimacy of the European Union. 
 Kumlin (2009), using the 2002 wave of the European Social Survey in 24 countries in 
and around Europe, discovered that citizens’ confidence in and support of the EU was 
significantly lower in larger member nations that adequately protected the health and wellbeing 
of its citizens. In other words, citizens’ who judged their quality of life as “fairly good” or 
“great” were more distrustful of the EU. In Western European countries, trust in the EU as a 
political institution was also directly fueled by their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with national 
public services and organizations. Dissatisfied European citizens from nations that provided 
robust welfare benefits distrusted and blamed the EU for their misgivings. Kumlin concluded 
that citizens’ trust in the EU was dependent on perceptions of whether the EU member nation 
protected and cared for its citizens, especially those with financial or social needs. 
 More specifically, citizens’ quality of life, measured by their socio-economic resources, 
perceived benefits from EU membership and life satisfaction, positively shaped confidence in the 
EU (Arnold 2012). The more satisfied citizens were with their quality of life and economic 
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health, the more confidence they had in the EU. On the other hand, the economic debt crisis, 
which negatively impacted much of Europe and resulted in rising unemployment rates and lower 
wages, left citizens questioning what the EU was doing to ensure their economic wellbeing. With 
a rise in terror and conflict, citizens, who had most at stake, questioned whether the EU was 
ensuring their safety and protecting their needs. In either case, when the EU citizens were 
unhappy, insecure, or felt that the EU was not performing its duties socially, politically or 
economically, they blamed the EU and trusted the Union less. In short, when citizens’ quality of 
life was threatened, so was their confidence in the EU.  
Intersections of Political and Economic Legitimacy 
  Quality of life and its relation to political trust, however, are not quite so clear-cut and 
often incorporate citizens’ personal values and political views. Using the public opinion polls 
from the 2008 Eurobarometer 69, Primozic (2009), found that personal values had little to no 
effect on citizens’ confidence in the EU with the exception of how citizens’ viewed democracy 
and solidarity. In Member States where citizens valued democracy, there was more confidence in 
national institutions. Similarly, member country citizens who valued solidarity voiced more trust 
in the EU than in their national institutions. 
 When it comes to whether or not the European Union is deemed legitimate, one has to 
consider the individuals or groups in charge. Crespy (2014), in her critical account of the need 
for a reappraisal of conflict in the EU around the issue of democratic legitimacy and deliberative 
democracy
7
, argued that EU governance is largely elitist and technocratic. The operations of the 
EU are entirely elite-based, reliant upon those who hold power, privilege or resources in society. 
Crespy (2014) found that dissenting voices of the average citizens were often excluded and 
                                                 
7
 Deliberative or discursive democracy is a form of democracy in which conflict-based discussion and deliberation 
are central to the decision-making process within the EU (Crespy 2014: 88). 
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undermined the democratic legitimacy of the EU polity. In other words, it was the power elite 
stakeholders that ultimately controlled and organized the European Union. She argued that the 
EU must create a deliberative, transparent, and equal democracy [for all to participate in]. By 
permitting all citizens, but especially the average citizen, to channel their views and voice their 
concerns to the EU, they are not only participating in the deliberative decision making process 
and policy output, but are as a consequence, helping create a better quality of life that does not 
benefit only the elite (Crespy 2014:82-83). 
 On balance, the definition of quality of life and economic health in the EU comes down 
to who is defining it: the political and economic elites or the average citizen. The average citizen, 
whose voice is typically dismissed, does not benefit as much from the EU economic and political 
system as the political elites do. 
Citizens’ Working Knowledge of Institutions 
 Political legitimacy of and citizens’ trust in the EU also comes down to how informed 
and knowledgeable citizens are about the European Union. Karp, Banducci, and Bowler (2003), 
in their study of cognitive mobilization (citizens’ knowledge), institutional confidence and 
economic benefits of the EU, found that citizens’ lack of knowledge about the EU was one of the 
largest impediments to their evidence based evaluation the EU’s performance. Citizens, in the 
Oct – Nov 1999 Eurobarometer 52.0 survey (a face-to-face survey questionnaire of about 30,000 
EU citizens), who had a solid understanding of the EU, positively evaluated the EU’s success. 
However, perception of costs and fewer benefits from being a part of the EU led to more 
negative views about the European Union.  
 Transparency in communication between leading political actors in the governing body 
and EU citizens is essential for creating an informed citizenry. Meyer (1999), in his study of 
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political communication in the EU, found that a technocratic mindset and associated language, 
and resultant lack of transparency and poor communication about policies and procedures eroded 
public trust in the legitimacy and success of the EU. For example, policy documents shared 
publicly to encourage transparency and political action were “riddled with technocratic jargon 
and little explanation” (Meyer 1999:629). As a result, key issues and policies that may have been 
of public interest were lost in the complex and distorted methods of communication. 
Consequently, he posited that the European Commission failed their duties to achieve democratic 
legitimacy and public support. Meyer concluded that, transparency, as in strong, clear, and direct 
public communication, is vital to the success and political legitimacy of any governing body. 
 A specific illustration of the legitimacy impediments of opaque communication was seen 
when Central and Eastern Europe were added into the EU beginning in 2004 (Stefanova 2016). 
The technocratic jargon language led to euro skepticism. The institutional and technical nature 
and language of the European Union’s expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was 
inadequate to garner public support and confidence in the new EU member states. In fact, the 
political elite and the EU administration dismissed the average citizen’s negative views of the 
EU’s expansion. To the elites, this accession is “a major opportunity in political and economic 
terms” (Stefanova 2016:278) and communicated it as so with the public. This story of the EU’s 
expansion resulted in several negative consequences for the EU’s political legitimacy and 
citizens’ trust in the EU. By and large, it decreased public support because of negative 
perceptions of the benefits of EU membership and frustration with the lack of transparent 
communication (Stefanova 2016:281-282). Stefanova (2016) concluded that the EU 
administration’s failure to communicate with and address the concerns of the average citizen 
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resulted in an unfortunate decline in not only the EU’s political legitimacy but also in citizens’ 
faith in the democratic image of European Union and its future. 
Informed knowledge about the EU also had the power to change citizens’ demands of and 
expectations from the EU administration and related political institutions. Hobolt (2012), in her 
study of the intrinsic relationship between the national governments, EU institutions and citizens, 
concluded that the more knowledgeable citizens were, the more they demanded, and expected 
better quality change and action, from not only their national state but also from the EU. Her 
research found this to be true at all levels, personal, national, and EU, in the 2009 27 Members 
States European Elections Studies (EES); “over half [of the citizens] are fairly or very satisfied 
with how democracy works in the EU – slightly more than the proportion of citizens who are 
satisfied with democracy in their own country” (Hobolt 2012:100). The more citizens understood 
how EU democracy worked procedurally, the more knowledge-based their opinions on the EU’s 
effectiveness were. There was an immediate sense of public ownership in the institutions, 
regardless of one’s level in society, and a desire to be a part of the decision-making process, a 
rather anti-elitist perspective. This perspective was reinforced by Sternberg (2013: 80) who 
argued that there was an inherent need to align integration with citizen desires in order for the 
EU to address the expectations of the citizens and achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the EU 
citizens. In short, citizens’ satisfaction with and faith in the EU was not based on a single 
legitimating factor, but rather citizens’ trust in national, state, and EU institutions and their 
knowledge of the EU itself. 
 Citizens’ knowledge of major events and crises across Europe and in their home nations 
also shaped their confidence in political institutions such as the EU. The 2009 EU Debt Crisis for 
example, not only negatively impacted most European economies but has drastically changed 
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public opinion on the economic future and viability of the European Union. Corbu (2013), who 
used interviews with eleven economic experts and a national survey of about 1002 citizens in 
Romania, concluded that citizens with little to no knowledge of the EU and current events across 
Europe were more likely to use utilitarian criteria, what is most practical and attractive to them 
personally, to evaluate the EU and its legitimacy post-Euro crisis. Most of Corbu’s respondents 
felt more optimistic about the EU’s future than the future of Romania or of their personal 
situations (2013). On balance, Corbu asserted that major crisis, such as the Euro Crisis, did not 
drastically diminish European citizens’ confidence in the EU; in fact, the majority believed that 
the EU would be able to turn things around, even if not immediately (2013). 
 On balance, knowledgeable citizens have the power to drastically change public opinion 
about the viability of the European Union, at the member nation and the citizen levels. Trust in 
the European Union seemed to be centered on knowledgeable citizens, their informed demands 
and expectations of the EU, as well as their sense of public ownership in the performance and 
success of national and broader public institutions.  
State of Scholarly Knowledge about EU Legitimacy 
 It is evident that at the heart of citizens’ confidence in the European Union is how 
politically and economically legitimate their citizens saw the organization as well as how 
informed and educated they were about EU policies and EU history. While the research linking 
citizens’ trust in the EU system to their knowledge of political institutions and quality of life was 
illuminating, their conclusions were conflicting. For example, Harteveld, van der Meer, De Vries 
(2013), and Arnold et al (2012) found that citizens’ trust in the national institutions were 
positively associated with their faith in EU’s political legitimacy while Munoz, Torcal, and 
Bonet (2011) and Kumlin (2009) discovered a negative relationship between citizens’ confidence 
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in national and EU-wide institutions. Likewise, the logic of extrapolation from Harteveld et al 
(2013) were contradictory. Primovic, Bavec (2009) and Arnold et als (2012) work on quality of 
life and economic health also proved incongruous. Despite these mixed results, there is general 
agreement that everything boils down to trust, the backbone of society, which is vital to ensuring 
successful democracy and that informed citizenry had more confidence in both their national 
institutions and the EU, compared to their less informed counterparts.  
The research presented in this paper, attempted to reconcile some of these contradictions 
by comparatively assessing the impact of knowledge and economic health on citizen confidence 
in the EU. Moreover, it relied on the most recent data available from the Eurobarometer survey. 
These updated findings will be useful to the EU administration as they work on re-examining 
their policies and reforms to garner more public support and trust. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 This study explored citizens’ confidence in the future of the European Union to 
understand the roles that its stakeholders, the elites and average citizens, might play in shaping it 
future. More specifically, how might EU citizens’ confidence in the EU and in the organization’s 
future, be shaped by citizens’ knowledge of the EU and/or their economic health? Answers to 
these questions can offer clues into whether the political legitimacy of the EU will be defined by 
the political elite, the average citizen, or both. Regional differences were also examined to assess 
how confidence in the EU and its political legitimacy might vary depending on the regional 
context. Content analyses of sample current events and regional news about the political elite and 
the average citizen were used to illustrate the regional differences in the Eurobarometer survey 
findings. The formal research question posed was, “How do informed EU citizenry and 
economic health impact their confidence in the European Union?”   
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Trust in social institutions is a vital component to the success or failure of major institutions and 
democracies. Organizations that enjoy a large degree of public support and trust tend to also have 
more political legitimacy thereby making them more effective and valuable to its members. But, 
how do organizations build trust in their effectiveness? And is trust in organizational 
effectiveness widely shared across the society? Or is trust the prerogative of the elite and not the 
masses? This study, which evaluated the relative roles of informed citizenry and their quality of 
life on citizens’ confidence in the EU, tested these alternative perspectives on organizational 
efficiency. 
 Parsons’ Structural Functionalism (Parsons 1975; Powers 2010) is theoretically useful in 
explaining organizational effectiveness and trust from the average EU citizens’ perspective; 
organizations are most effective when the average citizen is involved. On the other hand, theories 
of political and power elites (Domhoff 2005; Gilens 2014) offer a counter perspective: effective 
organizations meet the needs of and are determined by the elites and not so much the average 
citizen. In other words, there will be a direct relationship between what the elites want and need, 
and what the organization accomplishes, leaving the average citizen out of the equation (Hage 
and Dewar 1973). 
 Irrespective of whether organizations serve the elites or the average citizen, how is 
organizational efficiency achieved? Applied to the EU, an argument can be made that in order 
for EU citizens’ to have confidence, the Union needs to be efficient. According to the Principle 
of Organizational Efficiency, long-term organizational efficiency and effectiveness is a positive 
function of (a) success in maintaining uniform mission awareness and accurate institutional 
history, (b) depth of commitment to minimizing repetition of past mistakes and taking other steps 
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to improve performance, (c) organizational capacity for assessing challenges and instituting 
change without interrupting normal operations, and (d) adequacy of alignment of training, 
information, resources, and operational authority with the tasks people are called on to perform 
in their roles (Powers 2010: 173). Stated from an EU standpoint, its administration will find 
ways to maintain organizational effectiveness in order to garner citizens’ support and confidence. 
But whose support and confidence is the European Union trying to gain and keep? Is it the power 
elites or the average citizens? 
Model of Systemic Coupling 
 The European Union’s organizational efficiency, seen from a Systemic Coupling 
perspective within a Structural Functionalist worldview, would posit that, other things being 
equal, the ability of an organization to maintain its mission focus is a positive function of tight 
systemic coupling. In other words, an effective organization will maintain (a) a stable shared 
awareness of common ends, (b) open and honest lines of communication (c) effective allocation 
of resources with mission involvement, and (d) have people at different locations within the 
system with a sense of common fate (Powers 2010: 165). A weakly coupled system, in contrast, 
is a function of individuals or structures in society becoming autonomous and independent units 
from one another.  
 Applied to the research question at hand, the European Union will be evaluated by its 
citizens as doing its job poorly by citizens who have limited knowledge of EU goals and policies. 
To the extent that the EU does not maintain transparency and fails to build and promote stable 
awareness and knowledge of the Union’s purpose or policies to its citizens, the whole system 
will be deemed to be not only weakly coupled but also not faithful to its values of peace, stability 
and prosperity for all EU citizens (European Union 2016). In other words, the more knowledge 
83 
and understanding provided by the EU to the average citizen, and the more transparent the 
organization’s purpose, policies, and functioning, the more likely the average citizen is to have 
confidence in the EU as a legitimate political institution. If citizens do not think that the 
performance of the Union is efficient and effective, then the system will have to change to ensure 
the needs of the people are better met, their trust is kept, and their citizens feel like they are being 
well cared for. In other words, as captured by the Form Follows Function principle of Structural 
Functionalism (Powers 2010: 153), widespread patterns of structural change emerge as systemic 
responses to meet new needs or correct for poor performance in the face of old and emerging 
needs.  
 Following these theoretical lines of reasoning, it was predicted that Informed Citizenry 
will have a stronger positive influence, than citizens’ Economic Health, on members’ Confidence 
in the European Union, net of EU regions and demographics (Hypothesis 1). The more working 
knowledge and understanding the average citizen has about the EU (Informed Citizenry) and its 
benefits to them, the more likely they will be to endorse the political legitimacy of the EU and 
view its future positively. 
Theory of the Power Elite 
 On the contrary, it could be argued that it is not the average citizen but rather the power 
elite that control the EU’s future. In a power elite organizational model, the elite not only control 
and protect the most important power sources of society, they also have the resources to interject 
their interests and will into the mainstream societal structures and institutions (Lopez 2013:1-3). 
To paraphrase George William Domhoff (2005), it is the power elites, with their resources and 
power to influence the makeup of the institutional structures and policies that benefit most from 
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public institutions. They ensure that the system is set up in a way that prioritizes, privileges, and 
perpetuates their needs and interests over that of the average citizen.  
 In a political elite framework, it stands to reason that the power elites will be more likely 
to perceive the system as politically legitimate, trustworthy, and successful because their 
interests are protected and served (Gilens 2014). The average citizen who does not benefit as 
much, be it economically, politically, or socially, from the system will not be as confident about 
the future of the EU, likely blame the power elite for their misgivings, and question the EU’s 
political legitimacy. Stated differently, the power elite who control and benefit from the system 
will be likely to accept the political legitimacy and have more confidence in the EU’s future. In 
contrast, the average citizen might be more critical and negative of the EU. Following this power 
elite model, it was predicted (Hypothesis 2) that Economic Health of its citizens and nations will 
have stronger positive impact on citizens’ confidence in the European Union than Informed 
Citizenry, net of background characteristics and demographics of the citizens. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCE 
 A mixed methods approach was used to test the competing perspectives of the power elite 
and the average citizen models on the EU’s future. Secondary data from the 2009 Eurobarometer 
survey questionnaire were central to testing the hypotheses. Results from the survey analyses 
were elaborated on with the perspectives of professionals knowledgeable about the European 
Union and content analyses of news reports of the British Referendum, the EU debt crisis, the 
immigration crisis, and the rise in terrorism. The news articles and the professionals interviewed 
provided on-the-ground illustrations of stakeholders who control the political legitimacy and the 
future of the EU. The sample case studies of current events and regional news addressed the 
perspectives of the political elite, of the average citizen, or sometimes both. 
85 
Secondary Survey Data 
 The “Eurobarometer 72.4: Globalization, Financial and Economic Crisis, Social Change 
and Values, EU Policies and Decision Making, and Global Challenges”8, a cross-national and 
cross-temporal interview questionnaire conducted on behalf of the European Commission (2009) 
was the source of the quantitative data for this paper. These surveys, based on a multistage, 
national probability sample of citizens from EU member states monitor public opinion in 
European Union member states. Opinions about the performance of the EU, various EU policies, 
economic recovery, responses to global threats, and basic demographical data are ascertained. 
The questionnaire interviews were conducted in English and French between October 23, 2009 
and November 18, 2009 with 30,238 citizens in the 27 countries of the European Union
9
. 
 Because each EU nation and region has its own experiences and historical context, the 
analyses were disaggregated by major EU regions: Western (40.5%) and Eastern (41.0%) regions 
were represented more in the EU survey sample than the Mediterranean region (18.5%). The 
disproportionate regional representation was partly because both Western and Eastern regions 
are larger in terms of the number of countries it encompasses than the Mediterranean (Appendix 
A). As for citizen sample demographics, there was a fairly even split between male (46.5%) and 
female (53.5%) respondents. The sample was evenly distributed across the six different age 
groups; the largest group was 55 – 64 years old (26.7%). These background characteristics 
amongst other quality of life factors (Corbu 2013) have been shown to make a difference in how 
EU citizens thought about the future of the EU. Hence, they will be controlled for in the 
multivariate analyses. 
Qualitative Methodology 
                                                 
8
 Will be referred to as Eurobarometer 72.4 in the remainder of the article. 
9
 The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the 
data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.  
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 In keeping with a mixed methods design, the statistical analyses of the Eurobarometer 
survey were supplemented with content analyses of current events and regional news as well as 
two qualitative interviews. The two interviewees were professionals, from European Union 
member nations. Both were female ambassadors and officers, respectively for NATO and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the EU. They were asked a series of questions via 
email about their thoughts on how EU citizens’ confidence in the future of the EU is impacted by 
informed citizenry and their economic health. Refer to Appendix B for the consent form and the 
interview protocol. 
 Current events analyzed for this research included news reports from various news 
sources and blogs that discuss major current events and issues such as the widespread migrant 
crisis, the British Referendum, the EU Debt Crisis, and the rise in terrorist attacks in Western 
Europe. These reports not only supplemented the quantitative EU regional differences and 
interviewee comments, but was also used alongside the 2009 Eurobarometer findings to further 
explain the quantitative results. This content analysis provides a glimpse of the numbers in action 
and provide examples of how current events such as a terrorist attack has the ability to affect 
citizens’ faith and confidence in the EU. These current events and pressing matters also had the 
potential to shape EU citizens’ confidence in the EU due to how the issue was handled or 
communicated, how the individual was affected by the event, or how much accurate (or 
inaccurate) knowledge the citizens had about said current event. Articles were randomly selected 
from a series reputable sources then read in-depth to ensure validity. From there, articles that 
connected to the concept of the political elite versus the average citizen and the political 
legitimacy of the European Union were chosen to use as case studies for the purpose of helping 
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further explain the quantitative data with on-the-ground and more current illustrations of what is 
going on within the EU that has the ability to affect EU citizens’ faith in the institution. 
CONTENT AND DATA ANALYSES 
 Three levels of statistical data analysis were used to examine and answer the research. 
The descriptive analyses, which drew a portrait of the EU sample, aided in setting the context for 
further explorations into the research question at hand. The preliminary glimpses into the roles of 
informed citizenry and their economic health in their confidence in the EU’s legitimacy and 
future, offered in the bivariate analyses, were retested using multivariate regression analyses. It 
was in the multivariate analyses that the net comparative strengths of informed citizens versus 
their economic health in shaping citizen confidence in the EU were identified. A comparative 
regional analysis was also conducted and explicated with content analyses of regional current 
events. 
Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis 
 On balance, most EU respondents trusted the EU, even if they disagreed with certain 
policies or projects the Union has undertaken. Citizens also had elementary knowledge about the 
EU but did not know how the organization functions or which nations are members. Lastly, the 
economic and personal wealth of the EU citizens was in the middle-class range; their economic 
wellbeing was not polarized at either end of the economic spectrum. 
Confidence in the EU 
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 As the EU has been continuously hit with one crisis after another, confidence of their 
citizens continues to be a concern for the EU administration. Citizen views on both the strengths 
of the EU and its challenges were measured (Table 1.A.)
10
. 
 From the citizens’ perspectives, the strengths of the EU lay in its positive future 
directions, its membership status, and overall satisfaction with the EU. Citizen respondents were 
more likely (58.6%) than not, to trust the EU, its Council (the main EU decision-making body, at 
61.0%), and to be optimistic about the future of the EU (71.4%). On balance, EU citizens felt 
that the EU was fairly strong and successful in its mission; the average score on the EU strength 
index was 28.64 on a scale of 7.0 to 43.0 (Appendix C, Table 1.A.A.). 
 However, there was some reticence hesitance in the full-throated endorsement of the EU; 
the hesitation became clearer when looking at the citizens’ opinions on the system’s weaknesses 
(Appendix C, Table 1.A.B.). Some of the prominent complaints were that the EU had grown too 
rapidly (67.5%) and were short of ideas and projects (at the time of the survey, at 54.5%). As 
summarized by the cumulative index mean of 5.45 (on an index range from 2.0 – 8.0), EU 
respondents tended to be somewhat neutral, even slightly negative, when talking about the 
weaknesses of the European Union as a system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 A factor analysis of the confidence in the EU questions revealed two dimensions in the confidence index: one set 
highlighted the strengths of the EU while the second captured the EU’s weaknesses. Therefore, the analyses were 
also split along these two dimensions when appropriate. 
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Table 1.A. Confidence in the EU 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
Concept Dimensio
ns 
Values Statistics 
Total 
Sample 
(n = 13797) 
Western 
Europe 
(n=5819) 
Eastern 
Europe 
(n=5090) 
Mediterrane
an 
(n=2374) 
Confiden
ce in the 
EU 
 
EU 
Strengths 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min–
Max 
28.64 
(6.09) 
7.0–43.0 
27.91 
(6.47) 
7.0 – 43.0 
29.0 
(5.80) 
9.0 – 43.0 
29.41
*** 
(5.82) 
10.0 – 43.0 
 
 EU 
Weaknes
ses 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max 
5.45 
(1.38) 
2.0 – 8.0 
5.58 
(1.39) 
2.0 – 8.0 
5.21 
(1.37) 
2.0 – 8.0 
5.70
***
 
(1.33) 
2.0 – 8.0 
 Index of 
Confiden
ce in the 
EU
1
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max  
34.1 
(5.77) 
12.0 – 49.0 
33.45 
(6.03) 
12.0 – 48.0 
34.21 
(5.45) 
15.0 – 48.0 
35.12
***
 
(5.77) 
15.0 – 49.0 
   1 
Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses.  
    Possible range: 12.0-49.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06
***
 to .49
***
 at a   
    .000 significance level. 
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 Overall, as of 2009, the average EU respondent lay somewhere in the middle, neither too 
confident nor too insecure in their faith and confidence in the EU’s future; the overall confidence 
index mean was 34.1 on a range from 12.0 to 49.0. Interestingly, Mediterranean and Eastern 
European nation citizens were slightly more confident in the EU than their Western European 
counterparts. 
 It is not surprising that the moderate confidence recorded in the 2009 Eurobarometer 
survey has been further shaken by a number of tragic events that recently hit the EU member 
nations. Among these unfortunate events is the recent rise in the terrorist attacks, particularly in 
Western Europe. Britain, France, Turkey, Norway, Belgium, and Germany, have all faced 
terrorist attacks that have shattered the confidence and faith of citizens across the EU (Peek 
2016). The physical damage caused by these horrific events was easy to see, the number of 
injured and dead was easy to count and to mourn, But, the fears and loss of confidence that many 
citizens experienced was even more poignant than the physical damages (Hope, Foster, Hughes 
2016).  
 Dozens of journalists also hypothesized that each of these attacks were not about 
targeting a specific group of people or nation but rather the European Union at large (Pearce and 
Chad 2016), a perspective endorsed by many EU leaders. As the European Commission 
President, Jean-Claude Juncker, following the devastating Brussels airport attack, stated, “these 
attacks have hit Brussels today, and Paris yesterday, but it is Europe as a whole that has been 
targeted” (Pearce and Chad 2016). Similar waves of attacks that occurred in France in the year 
prior to the Brussels bombing, and more recently the lorry truck attacks in Stockholm and 
Barcelona or the Manchester bombing, to name a few, have brought to the forefront questions 
about the open borders across Europe and the consequent vulnerability of Member States (Peek 
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2016). Some Eurosceptic European leaders, such as George Eustice, capitalized on these fears of 
vulnerability to fuel citizens’ distrust in their national governments and the EU governance 
(Hope, Swinfold, Foster and Hughes 2016). Hope and his colleagues endorsed the rationale 
offered by Minister Eustice, a pioneer for border controls within the EU, that having stronger 
borders within the EU would allow national governments to protect their citizens from terrorism. 
In other words, using the influx of refugees and terrorist attacks in Western Europe to incite 
panic and fear, the media and political-economic leaders alike stoked distrust in the EU and its 
legitimate ability to serve and protect its citizens. 
 No doubt, there is no population in the world that is completely exempt from any form of 
major atrocities, no matter how prepared and safe a city or region is. If the leadership of a nation 
or larger governing body like the EU however, is not able to meet the needs of its citizens and 
protect them from these horrific, large-scale acts of violence, then the average citizen will not 
only dismiss the EU’s legitimacy and success but also have little to no trust in the system. Under 
these challenging circumstances, citizens are more likely, than not, to vote to change their 
leaders and the political regime in its entirety (Peek 2016). Although this has yet to occur on a 
grand scale across the European Union, similar movements and structural changes have been 
witnessed around the world. A most notable example is the Arab Spring, which occurred less 
than a decade ago. What began with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a lower-class 
Tunisian street vendor, quickly spread like wildfire across the Middle East and North Africa 
resulting in episodes of unrest, disruptive activism, and the eventual overthrowing of political 
leaders such as Mubarak [Egypt], Ben Ali [Tunisia], and Qadaffi [Libya] (Alimi and Meyer 
2011). Because these authoritarian regimes dismissed and ignored the needs of the average 
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citizen and failed to protect all citizens, many decided to [successfully] fight back and demand 
leadership change. 
 Added to the terrorist attacks and the ensuing political and economic turmoil, was the 
refugee crisis, which shook up the EU regions even more. The growing turmoil and civil unrest 
in the Middle East, which reached a peak in 2014, led to more than a million migrants, 
predominantly through Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, to come into the European 
Union, in search of a better life (BBC 2016). According to The Telegraph, a British newspaper, 
as of November 2015, more than 1 million refugees and migrants had illegally arrived in Europe; 
one in 22 of the migrants were deemed to be refugees by the UN refugee agency (Holehouse and 
Smith 2016). The count of refugees has been estimated to have grown even more and is believed 
to have reached record levels in 2017, as per the President of the European Union Council 
(Williams 2017). 
 The surge of refugees, along with other economic crises that the Union already faced, 
created a perfect storm of events that worsened the political turmoil in the continent. The refugee 
crisis occurred as the EU continent was attempting to recover from the debt and related 
economic disasters (The Economist 2016). The European Institute (European Affairs) noted that 
the EU debt crisis has “heightened anti-immigrant feelings” across the EU, amongst average 
citizens and political elites alike. This has resulted in a series of political crisis, not only about 
the internal and external EU border controls but also whether the EU administration is doing 
enough to protect its Member States and their EU citizens. Furthermore, political tensions in the 
EU have been steadily rising due to the disproportionate burden faced by the more economically 
sturdy member countries which must then care for the less economically stable nations in the 
Mediterranean and Eastern European regions. Making matters worse is the fact that EU Member 
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States with weaker economies such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary, among other Eastern and 
Mediterranean EU nations have received the majority of migrants (BBC 2016; European Affairs 
N.d.).  
 Besides, many Western European and some Eastern European political leaders have 
argued that opening borders to migrants puts the lives of European citizens at risk and 
destabilizes the EU system in place (Hope et al. 2016). The polarized political sentiments around 
the migrant crisis created further rifts amongst EU Member States because the crisis discussions 
failed to incorporate all stakeholders involved. The typical complaints were that the EU was 
taking into consideration only the perspectives of the elites and the more powerful EU Member 
States, and did not acknowledge and incorporate the voices of the average citizens and nations 
being affected first hand. The average citizens’ growing concerns and distrust were a 
consequence of the clashes in voiced perspectives, or a lack there of, between the political elite 
and the average citizen. 
 The upcoming decades certainly promise to be pivotal to the future of the European 
Union and its political legitimacy. With the French elections coming up this spring, Eurosceptic 
Marine Le Pen looks to take power, return the French franc and hold a French referendum on EU 
membership (Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister has formally 
begun the process of leaving the EU. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, a radical populist who 
was also calling for a vote to leave the EU and the “de-Islamization” of the Netherlands failed to 
win the elections but still managed to gain some seats (Deacon 2016; Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). 
Germany gears up for election sin the fall and Italy in early 2018, both of whom have political 
parties calling for referendums on their respective country’s EU membership (The Economist 
2017). As Mcdonald-Gibson stated in a recent Time article, “While populists [like Wilders and 
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Le Pen] are creating new visions for the future, traditional European powers are scrambling to 
uphold the lofty ideals of the past. If they can’t find a way to fit in with the new world order [and 
re-instill confidence in its citizens], they might not have much of a future at all” (2017:39). 
Informed citizenry 
 One mechanism to improve citizens’ confidence in the European Union and their views 
on EU political legitimacy is through improving their knowledge and understanding of the EU 
structures, its history, and its policies. The concept of Informed Citizenry (Table 1.B) and its 
component indicators offered a generalized view of how educated citizens were about the 
European Union. Citizens’ breadth of knowledge and understanding of the EU and the EU 
administration was represented by both general knowledge of and understanding about its 
purpose as well as EU policies
11
. 
 On the face of it, citizens’ general knowledge of the EU remained fairly elementary; they 
knew little about the general purpose of EU organization, it history and functioning (Appendix 
D, Table 1.B.A.). More than half the EU respondents had difficulty answering a set of three true 
or false questions correctly (got question one wrong: 55.6%, got question two wrong: 18.1%, got 
question three wrong 56.1% respectively). With a cumulative mean of 3.71 on a knowledge 
index range of 0.0 – 6.0, it was evident that while citizens generally knew what the EU and its 
council was, they did not have general working knowledge of the EU processes and its history. 
This lack of clear understanding of the structure, history, and policies of the EU makes it difficult 
for citizens to offer evidence based judgements of whether the EU is fulfilling its role and to 
endorse the organization or not. Yet, EU citizens were quite positive about the effectiveness of 
EU policies enacted to combat the widespread economic crisis at the time of the survey 
                                                 
11
 Factor analysis of the informed citizenry questions revealed two main dimensions in the informed citizenry index: 
one set highlighted general EU knowledge of history and purpose while the second emphasized citizens’ knowledge 
of EU policies. Therefore, these analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate. 
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(Appendix D, Table 1.B.B.). More than half the respondents viewed the EU policy efforts 
extremely positively and successful (range of 78% to 82.6%). That EU respondents were not 
very knowledgeable about EU policies but quite content with the success of EU policies was 
recapped in the cumulative index of policy knowledge mean of 12.12 on an index that ranged 
from 4.0 – 16.0.  
 Overall, the average EU citizen was fairly well informed with reasonable knowledge of 
the EU and its purpose (cumulative index of Informed Citizenry mean was 15.83 on a scale from 
5.0 to 22.0). Interestingly, EU citizens from the Mediterranean nations were more knowledgeable 
about the EU and its history and policies in contrast to Western European citizens who had the 
least amount of knowledge. The vast majority of average citizens felt that they knew the role of 
the EU but had little to no understanding of how it works and the types of policies and work the 
Union actually does. To quote an International Staff Executive Officer for NATO (Interviewee 
#1), “the average informed citizen still understands very little of what is going on due to the 
vastness and complexity of the various institutes. They may have some idea of purpose but not 
much on policies.” In lacking even, the most basic knowledge of the EU and how it works, the 
average citizen is unable to recognize the ways in which the EU is succeeding or failing at 
addressing their specific needs and therefore will likely deem the EU to be slightly less 
legitimate and untrustworthy. 
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Table 1.B. Informed Citizenry 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
Conce
pt 
Dimensi
on 
Values  Statistics 
Total 
Sample 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Mediterrane
an 
Inform
ed 
Citizen
ry 
Index of 
General 
EU 
Knowled
ge 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max 
(n) 
3.70 
(1.28) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(9176) 
3.72 
(1.30) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(4262) 
3.72 
(1.23) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(3251) 
3.58
***
 
(1.29) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(1319) 
 Index of 
Policy 
Knowled
ge 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max 
(n) 
12.12 
(2.47) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(13015) 
11.78 
(2.51) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(5494) 
12.15 
(2.40) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(4769) 
12.93
***
 
(2.32) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(2271) 
 Index of 
Informed 
Citizenry
1
 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max 
(n) 
15.83 
(2.96) 
5.0 – 22.0 
(8832) 
15.57 
(3.01) 
5.0 – 22.0 
(4088) 
15.83 
(2.90) 
5.0 – 22.0 
(3121) 
16.63
***
 
(2.82) 
6.0 – 22.0 
(1290) 
1 
Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of 
Policy Knowledge. Possible range: 5.0–22.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged 
from .03
***
 to .65
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
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 The British Referendum (Brexit) in June of 2016 was a perfect example of what can 
occur when citizens’ had poor understanding of the European Union and what EU membership 
entails. The Brexit vote, which had a 71.8% turnout, recorded that 51.9% of citizens voted to 
leave the EU versus 48.1% voting to stay in the EU (Hunt and Wheeler 2017), left many elites in 
disbelief. Despite pro-EU urgings from the leaders of the largest British political parties, the then 
Prime Minister David Cameron, major business leaders, trade unions, esteemed scientists and 
economists, and more, about 17.4 million British citizens voted to leave the EU (Chu 2016; Hunt 
and Wheeler 2017). The question is why? 
 In the months following Brexit, much has been written in the journalistic and scholarly 
circles about not only the repercussions of this decision on the average citizen and the economic 
well-being of the United Kingdom, but more importantly that the voters were largely uninformed 
and voted blindly to leave the European Union. British voters were quite unaware of even the 
most elementary political facts and history. Such lack of awareness became especially clear 
when the Google Trends Twitter account reported that in the hours after the poll closed, there 
was a 250 percent increase in people searching “what happens if we leave the EU” and “what is 
Brexit” (Walton 2016). In a survey of 1,000 people completed by Ipsos MORI, a market research 
company in the UK and Ireland, it was also concluded that British citizens’ perceptions of the 
British government and of the EU was way off from the actual facts and figures (Peck 2016). In 
Peck’s analyses, approximately 15% of British citizens, one in seven, were reported to believe in 
at least one Euro-myth, an exaggerated or invented story about nonsensical EU legislation or EU 
bodies (also, Wikipedia 2016) (2016). These inaccuracies and misunderstandings of the political 
systems in place and lack of awareness of the potential policy changes resulted in a major change 
not only for the UK but also for the entire European Union (Friedman 2016). 
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 Some journalists placed the onus for the high levels of public ignorance on the media and 
the British politicians. On the other hand, others have posited that the Brexit vote goes beyond a 
simple lack of knowledge and actually has to do with the cultural, economic, and political 
divides in the country. Ben Chu, The Independent’s Economics Editor and its previous chief lead 
writer, argued that “the crude majoritarian politics of this referendum has seen half of the 
population, a generally poorer, less well-educated and elderly half, effectively strip major 
freedoms and even a cherished identity from the other half, a more prosperous and 
predominantly younger half” (2016). In either event, the average citizens, who barely had a 
rudimentary sense of the pros and cons of Brexit, voted to leave the UK (Friedman 2016). 
Ironically, the average poorly informed Brexit voter voted against his or her own economic 
interests; they were also the economically marginalized in the country. Brexit is the ultimate 
proof of the political and economic turmoil that an uninformed voting citizenry can unleash and 
perhaps explain why (in Table 1B), Western European respondents were slightly less informed 
than their Eastern and Mediterranean resident counterparts. 
Economic elites and their wellbeing 
 While it has been argued that an average citizen could shape the perceived legitimacy and 
success of the EU, it is important to also recognize the power that the elites have in controlling 
the dominant view of the EU.  
 Economic Elites, and their economic standing, was examined by the economic success 
and wellbeing of EU citizens at two levels: (1) the individual level (Appendix E, Table 1.C.A.) 
and (2) the national level (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.)
12
. Citizens from Western European nations 
                                                 
12
 Factor analysis of the economic health questions revealed two main dimensions in index economic health: one set 
reflected the personal economic and financial well-being of EU citizens while the second highlighted the national 
economic well-being and health EU member states. Therefore, the analyses were also split along these two 
dimensions when appropriate. 
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were much better in personal and national economic health than their Eastern and Mediterranean 
counterparts. Western European citizens had a better quality of life and economic well-being, 
reflected in the economic index mean of 42.93 on a scale of 19.0 – 60.0. EU citizens from 
Eastern European and Mediterranean nations had about the same level of personal economic 
wealth but differed when it came to their nation’s economic health; Eastern European citizens 
had a slightly higher national index mean (19.41) than their Mediterranean counterparts (18.76). 
 On a personal economic health level, the majority of the EU participants rated themselves 
as a part of the middle class of society, Boxes 4 – 7 on a scale of 1 to 10 (77.3%). From the 
citizens’ perspective, their personal economic health lay in their economic standing within 
society as well as their satisfaction with their personal economic and financial situations. Citizen 
respondents were quite positive when asked about their lives; three quarters of citizens felt fairly, 
if not very satisfied with their lives (73.4%), and just over half judged their personal job (62.4%) 
and financial situations (60.9%) as good or very good. All things considered, while EU citizens’ 
personal economic and financial health was neither good nor bad, they were comfortable with 
their economic status (personal health index mean was 21.5 on a scale of 7.0 – 34.0). 
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Table 1.C. Economic Elites and Their Health 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
Concepts Dimensions Values  Statistics 
Total 
Sample 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Mediterranean 
Economic 
Elites & 
Their 
Health  
Personal 
Economic 
Health 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max 
(n) 
21.5 
(4.42) 
7.0 – 
34.0 
(10756) 
22.66 
(4.25) 
7.0 – 
34.0 
(4631) 
20.54 
(4.53) 
7.0 – 
34.0 
(3851) 
20.88
***
 
(4.06) 
7.0 – 33.0 
(1856) 
  
National 
Economic 
Health 
 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max 
(n) 
 
19.54 
(3.58) 
9.0 – 
30.0 
(10971) 
 
20.05 
(3.60) 
9.0 – 
30.0 
(4715) 
 
19.41 
(3.43) 
9.0 – 
30.0 
(4008) 
 
18.76
***
 
(3.57) 
9.0 – 28.0 
(1863) 
 Index of 
Economic 
Health
1
 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – 
Max 
(n) 
41.18 
(6.39) 
17.0 – 
60.0 
(8788) 
42.93 
(6.18) 
19.0 – 
60.0 
(3866) 
40.06 
(6.35) 
18.0 – 
60.0 
(3125) 
39.42
***
 
(6.0) 
17.0 – 57.0 
(1480) 
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1 
Index of Economic Health = Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-Index of 
National Economic Health. Possible range: 17.0 – 60.0. Correlations among these 
indicators ranged from .05
***
 to .07
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
 
 Although the EU Debt Crisis was only just beginning at the time of the survey, it is 
evident that the economic state at the national level was also important to EU citizens. There was 
concern and negative sentiments from EU citizens when discussing the current state of their 
national and EU economies (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.). The dominant view was that the 
national economy was doing rather badly or very badly (75%), as was their assessment of the 
European economy in general (63.6%). This being said, approximately half or more than half of 
EU citizens felt that the European economy was performing better or much better than other 
leading world economies such as the Chinese, the American, the Russian, and the Indian. As 
summarized by the cumulative mean of 19.54 on the index of national health which ranged from 
of 9.0 to 30.0, EU citizens tended to deem the health of the national and European economies as 
decent enough to get by, neither good nor bad. 
 Much has been written in the news positing that the economic problems facing the EU 
today go back to the global financial meltdown and euro-zone crisis of 2009 (Featherstone 2012; 
Mason 2016; Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). The EU Debt Crisis largely began taking its toll on 
nations across Europe in the final months of 2009; exposing not only the economic rifts between 
the rich Northern and Western European nations and the poorer South but also the “stagnant 
growth, high unemployment and public anger in member states of Italy, Greece, and Spain,” 
nations of the Mediterranean EU region (Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Despite the stabilization of 
the Euro zone, the growth rates are still incredibly low for citizens from the Mediterranean and 
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Eastern European regions (The Economist 2017). Moreover, unemployment rates to this day 
continue to remain high and the European Central Bank (ECB) has become overwhelmed by the 
number of loans that they have had to give out to nations across the EU (The Economist 2017). 
 Lord Howard, the former Tory leader, said: “The European Union, in its current form, is 
a flawed and failing project which is making many of its inhabitants poorer than they should or 
need be and is failing to keep its people safe. The first is a consequence of the euro, which has an 
exchange rate far too high for the crippled economies of southern Europe, though, because it is 
lower than the deutschmark would have been, helps to make Germany’s exports competitive. 
The second is a consequence of the Schengen agreement which, according to the former Head of 
Interpol ‘is like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe’” (Hope et al. 2016). Despite 
years of attempted austerity and severe economic reforms, many nations are still drowning in 
debts larger than that their economic output (Mason 2016; Kirk 2017). While the Western EU 
nations continued to flourish, many Mediterranean and Eastern EU nations floundered, causing 
even greater division between the elitist and the average nations (Mason 2016). 
Summary 
 Several conclusions are worth noting in the descriptive portrayal of EU citizens outlined 
above. (1) Most EU citizens positively viewed and trusted the European Union and its political 
legitimacy. Eastern and Mediterranean citizens were slightly more confident in the EU than their 
Western counterparts. (2) Although respondents did not understand how the EU functions or 
what nations make up the member states, many were able to identify some of the EU’s policies 
and their effectiveness. In this regard too, EU citizens’ from the Mediterranean had slightly more 
knowledgeable than their Western and Eastern counterparts. (3) As for their economic wellbeing, 
majority of respondents were satisfied with their personal financial wellbeing, despite the 
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stagnation in, or even worsening of their nation’s economic situation. Yet, citizens felt that the 
national and European economies were doing well in comparison to other nations and regions of 
the world. 
Bivariate Analyses 
 To test for preliminary empirical relationships of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic 
Health with citizens’ confidence in the future of the European Union, bivariate analyses were 
conducted. The preliminary correlations (Table 2 in Appendix F) indicated multiple strands in 
the potential strengths of informed citizenry and their economic health in shaping the future of 
the EU. 
 As might be expected, the more informed the citizens were and the better their economic 
health, the more confidence they had in the EU. However, EU citizens were much more likely to 
trust the EU (r = .53
***
) when they were informed than when they were satisfied with their 
economic wellbeing was healthy (r = .34
***
).  
 While not as strong as the knowledgeable citizenry and their economic health 
correlations, demographic factors were also related to EU confidence. Females (r = -.04
*
) and 
older EU citizens (-.07
**
) were slightly less confident than their male and younger counterparts 
respectively. Citizens from Mediterranean EU nations (r = .08
**
) had a bit more confidence in the 
EU and in its EU’s future than their Western European counterparts (r = -.09***). Mediterranean 
nation citizens were also faintly more informed and knowledgeable about the EU than citizens 
from Western European nations (Mediterranean: r = .11
***
; Western: r = -.08
**
). On the other 
hand, the economic health of Western EU nations and their citizens (r = .24
***
) was twice as 
strong and healthy than their Eastern (r = -.13
***
) and Mediterranean (r = -.12
***
) counterparts. 
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The robustness of the comparative of informed citizenry and their economic health on their EU 
confidence will be tested in the multivariate analyses presented in the subsequent section. 
Multivariate Regression Analyses 
 In the final analytical step, multivariate regression analyses were used to test the 
hypotheses about the net effects of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic Health on 
Confidence in the EU; sex, age, and EU regions were controlled. The analyses were also 
disaggregated by the three primary EU regions: Western, Eastern, and Mediterranean. 
 
Table 3. Regression Analyses of the Net Relative Impacts of Informed Citizenry and 
Economic Health on Confidence in the European Union; Beta (β) Coefficients, 2009 
Eurobarometer 72.4 
 Confidence in EU
1
 
Beta (β) 
Confidence in the EU
1
 
EU Strengths
2
 EU Weaknesses
3
 
Informed Citizenry
4
 .45
***
  .45
***
  -.11
***
  
 General EU 
Knowledge
5
 
 .24
***
  .26
***
  -.12
**
 
 Policy 
Knowledge
6
 
 .34
***
  .34
***
  -.05
**
 
Economic Elites & their 
Health
7
 
.25
***
  .28
***
  -.19
***
  
105 
  Personal 
Economic Health
8
 
 .17
***
  .19
***
  -.11
***
 
 National 
Economic Health
9
 
 .14
***
  .16
***
  -.12
***
 
Age
10
 -.03
*
 -.03
*
 .02
*
 .03
*
 
Sex
11
 .00 .00 .00 -.00 
Western Europe
12
 -.23
***
  -.22
***
 -.21
***
 -.03
*
 -.04
*
 
Eastern Europe
12
 -.15
*** 
 -.11
***
 -.10
***
 -.15
***
 -.16
***
 
Model Statistics: 
Constant 
 
13.98 
 
14.18 
 
5.92 
 
6.16 
 
8.06 
 
8.02 
Adjusted R
2
 .33
***
 .33
***
 .35
***
 .36
***
 .08
***
 .09
***
 
DF 1 & 2 7 & 6275 9 & 6273 7 & 
6275 
9 & 6273 7 & 6275 9 & 6273 
1
 Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU 
Weaknesses; range = 12.0 (low confidence) – 49.0 (high confidence). 
2
 Sub-Index of EU Strengths: Range of 7.0 (fairly weak/not strong) – 43.0 (very strong/very 
confident). See Appendix C Table 1.A.A for index components. 
3
 Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses: Range: 2.0 (not weak) – 8.0 (very  weak/poor confidence). 
See Appendix C. Table 1.A.B for index components. 
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4
 Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of Policy  
Knowledge; range = 5.0 (no knowledge, uninformed) – 22.0 (knowledgeable, well informed).  
5
 Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge: Range of 0.0 (no EU knowledge) – 6.0 (solid EU 
knowledge). See Appendix D. Table 1.B.A for index components. 
6
 Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge: Range of 4.0 (little/poor policy knowledge)-16. 
(good/strong policy knowledge).See Appendix D. Table 1.B.B for index components. 
 7
 Index of Economic Elites, their Health: Sub-index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-
Index of National Economic Health; Range of 17 (low/poor economic health)–60 
(good/strong health).  
8
 Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health: Range = 7 (poor personal economic health)–34 
(strong personal economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.A for index components.  
9
 Sub-Index of National Economic Health: Range of 9.0 (poor national economic health)–
30.0 (strong personal economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.B for index components. 
10
 Age: 1 = 15 – 24yrs, 2 = 25 – 34yrs, 3 = 35 – 44yrs, 4 = 45 – 54yrs, 5 = 55 – 64yrs, 6 =  
65yrs and older 
11
 Sex: 0 = Male, 1 = Female; 
12
 EU Regions: reference group is the other two regions. 
***
<=p .001; *p<=.05. 
 
 As was predicted from a Systemic Coupling framework, the more knowledgeable the 
average citizens were about the EU, its history and policies, the more confident and trusting they 
were of the EU (Beta = .45
***). While economic health also improved citizens’ confidence in the 
EU, its impact was substantially smaller than how informed citizens were, by approximately two 
times (Beta = .25
***
). Additionally, citizens from Western Europe were least confident in the 
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European Union (Beta = -.23
***
), followed by Eastern Europe (-.15
***
); ergo, of the three regions, 
Mediterranean citizens were the most confident. Male and female EU citizens did not differ in 
their confidence. Even though older respondents (Beta = -.03
**
) trusted the EU and its 
institutions less than their younger counterparts, the difference was minor.  
 The robustness of how knowledgeable citizens and economic elites shaped confidence in 
the EU was also verified in that these patterns did not differ across the three EU regions. Besides, 
irrespective of whether citizens’ knowledge or economic wellbeing were disaggregated by their 
constituent dimensions, informed citizens overall had a greater positive impact on shaping the 
future of the European Union and its political legitimacy, more than the economic elites and their 
health.  
 While all members of the uneven economic and political EU felt the impacts of the debt 
crisis, it was those who were hit the hardest that truly viewed the EU negatively because they 
were yet to reap any benefits from the institution (Interviewee #2). Because of this, the middle 
and lower classes of the EU, the average citizen, have less EU confidence than their elitist 
counterparts. Although the economic elites of society were also hit, they did not experience as 
much hardship or lose as much of their property and lifestyles as the average citizen because they 
already began with a greater amount of resources and privilege, and were only slightly 
negatively impacted by the crisis. 
 In a press conference last year, the former president of Poland, Donald Tusk stated, “All 
too often today, the European elites seem to be detached from reality” (Deacon 2016). He felt 
that their lack of interest in the well-being of all citizens of the European Union, had the power 
to not only change the EU agenda and to overlook the needs of the average citizen but also was 
one of the root causes of major events such as the British Referendum (Deacon 2016). 
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CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
Empirical and Applied 
 Previous research had shown that both informed citizenry and citizens personal and 
national economic health had huge, but separate, impacts on citizens’ confidence in the European 
Union and its legitimacy. There were however, no comparisons, to date, of the respective roles 
political elites and the average citizen played in shaping thinking about EU political legitimacy.  
 Important insights were gained about the strong role that informed citizens played in EU 
political legitimacy. While economic elites were important for politically legitimating the EU, 
their influence was not as important as that of the average citizen. The more knowledgeable and 
educated citizens were, the more likely they were to deem the EU as a legitimate political 
organization. Informed citizens are able to better understand whether or not their needs as 
average citizens are being met and well taken into account by their leaders; if they are not, they 
are able to more easily demand changes to be made. As for elites, the more economically healthy 
they were, the more they trusted the EU. Perhaps, unlike the average citizen who does not benefit 
as much from the system economically, politically, or socially, the elites control and benefit the 
most from the system and are more likely to be confident in the EU. The roles of informed 
citizenry versus elites were similar across the EU regions, even though Eastern European and the 
Mediterranean citizens both shared a slightly greater amount of trust in the EU than their 
Western EU counterparts.  
 These findings can inform the EU administration’s attempts to develop new policies and 
reforms to garner more public support and trust. For example, providing more transparent and 
easily accessible information to the public, about their meetings, their policies and their reforms, 
allows citizens to be more informed about the EU and how it benefits them and their home 
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nation. As Donald Tusk, the former president of Poland stated, “We must help people to restore 
faith in the fact that the EU should serve them, guarantee their protection and share their 
emotions” (Deacon 2016). By allowing the average citizen’s voice to be heard and listening to 
and acknowledging their needs, the EU can better address the needs of all its citizens and its 
Member States as opposed to simply taking care of the political, economic, and social elites of 
the Union. Although the elites will be major players in the EU and political and economic 
reforms, it is evident that the average citizen yields much more power than the economic and 
political elites when it comes to the legitimacy and the future of the EU. 
Theoretical Implications 
 While there was support for both theoretical predictions, as seen in Figure 1 below, the 
set of Systemic Coupling and Form Follows Function concepts had more support for 
understanding EU citizens’ confidence in the EU than the theory of power elites. On the one 
hand, when citizens lacked knowledge and awareness of the EU’s purpose, the system and its 
citizens became not only weakly coupled but the EU also failed to achieve its main purposes of 
peace, stability and prosperity for its citizens. On the other, when there was sustained shared 
awareness and knowledge between the EU and EU citizens, the system became moderately 
coupled with citizens. In short, when citizens were fairly well informed, the European Union was 
able to garner their citizens’ faith and trust by maintaining a degree of mission focus and a 
moderately coupled system. 
 
 
 
 
110 
Figure 1 
Empirical Model of the Comparative Effects of Informed Citizenry and Economic Elites on 
Confidence in the European Union
 1, 2, 3
 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
 
    1
 Refer to Table 3 for index coding;  
    2 
In the interest of clarity, the difference in sex (β = .00) was not presented. 
    3 
The differences in the effects of sub-indices of Confidence in the EU were minimal. If  
     interested, please contact the researcher. 
 
 Class-consciousness of power elites also shaped confidence in the EU but was not as 
influential as hypothesized by the Power Elite model. It is true that the more satisfied and 
economically healthy citizens were with their lives, the more confident they were in the EU and 
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its institutions; yet the elites were not as impactful in influencing overall confidence in the EU as 
the average citizen. To quote the Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU for the Republic of 
Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Interviewee #2): “following the economic 
downturn experienced across the EU in recent years, those who were hardest hit and those who 
have yet to feel any benefits from what was already a very uneven economic system, were more 
likely to view the EU negatively.” In other words, the middle and lower classes of the EU, the 
average citizen, unsurprisingly had the least amount of confidence in the EU. The lack of 
confidence might be because of the economic and social support provided to them by the EU 
and/or their national institutions. The political and economic elite, while also hit, did not 
experience as much hardship as the average citizen. The elites, who had access to resources and 
privilege, felt that they were benefitting from the EU and therefore deemed the EU to be more 
trustworthy and legitimate.  
Limitations and Suggestions for the Futures 
 Like most studies, this research was not free of limitations. While valuable insights into 
the dominant role of the average citizen in shaping confidence in the European Union were 
gained, many unresolved questions remain. For example, the research captured only 36 percent 
of variability in EU citizens’ confidence in the EU (Adjusted R2 = .36***). This leaves much 
about citizens’ EU confidence unexplained and opens possibilities for future research.  
 From the multivariate analyses, it was clear that by and large, the more informed and 
knowledgeable citizens were the more they tended to trust the European Union and the EU 
administration in a broad sense. However, as the NATO Executive Officer (Interviewee # 1) 
explained, the European Union is vast and complex in its structural make up of many smaller 
committees and institutions. Citizens and elite confidence will likely vary from institution to 
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institution within the EU. For example, future research should focus on specific EU institutions 
such as the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU). Targeted attention to specific issues, such as human rights, trade, IT security or external 
relations, would be warranted. 
 Another fruitful research investigation is exploring regional differences in citizens’ 
confidence in the EU and its political legitimacy. In the words of the Maritime Affairs Attaché to 
the EU (Interviewee #2), “While there is a general sense that citizens of many EU Member 
States are increasingly skeptical of the benefits of EU membership, it is important to recognize 
that EU citizens are not a homogenized group.” In other words, more granular country specific 
analyses are needed. Each EU Member State has a different culture, context, history, 
demographics, and experiences. In Greece for example, one of the hardest hit nations by 
economic and immigration crises, reforms will likely be received differently than say in 
Belgium, the headquarters of the European Union (located in downtown Brussels), who was 
recently faced with horrific acts of terrorism. Western European nations have also experienced a 
surprising rise in terrorism and issues of xenophobia and Islamophobia. By recognizing and 
acknowledging these contextual differences, one can more accurately evaluate citizen and elite 
opinions on the legitimacy and success of the Union. 
 Additional research that delves into how the media, social media in particular, shape 
citizens’ knowledge would provide more elaboration on citizens’ trust in the EU and EU’s 
political legitimacy. The way the EU administration communicates their policies and reforms 
could highlight not only the ways in which the EU succeeds or fails at maintaining transparent 
and easy to understand communication with their citizens but also how it is perceived and 
influences the average citizen. Both interviewees spoke to the roles that the media played in 
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many EU crises. The Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU (Interviewee #2) noted the press 
highlighting the case of the British EU referendum as a product of the voices of the average 
citizen not being heard. Media also provided little information to help citizens understand the EU 
and the referendum in order to be more informed voters. The Maritime Affairs EU Attaché went 
on to further explain the nuanced role of the media and communication thusly: 
 
“EU institutions are failing to communicate with their citizenry. The EU has had and 
continues to have an important role in the designation of social and human rights – on 
working conditions, social protection, poverty – yet since the economic downturn, the 
language of its communications has been too economically focused and it is failing to 
engage the media and hence its citizenry on these issues. It is too easy then for it be 
portrayed as has been the case a heartless bureaucracy whose primary concern is serving 
the interests of the market-it urgently needs to find” (Interviewee #2). 
 
 Finally, a methodological suggestion would be to update the quantitative analyses of the 
kind presented here with more recent and cross-temporal examination. Much has occurred since 
the data for the 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 were collected; there has been a rise in terror attacks, 
the debt crisis, various reform policies, and conflict, to name a few. The world is quite different 
from the one captured by the Eurobarometer seven years ago. A cross-temporal analysis could 
identify changes in the ways the average citizens and elites shape the political legitimacy of the 
EU. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
Table 1.D. Controls 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
Concep
ts 
Dimensio
ns 
Indicators Values and 
Responses  
Stats 
Socio-
demo-
graphics 
EU 
Regions 
 
Q1A       What is your 
nationality? 
                (n=27654) 
 
1 = Western Europe 
2 = Eastern Europe 
3 = Mediterranean 
 
40.5
%  
41.0  
18.5 
  
Demo-
graphics 
 
D10     Sex/Gender 
           (n=30238) 
 
1 = Female
1 
53.5 
 
  
 
 
D11     How old are you? 
           (n=30238) 
1 = 15 – 24 years 
2 = 25 – 34 years 
3 = 35 – 44 years 
4 = 45 – 54 years 
5 = 55 – 64 years 
6 = 65 years and 
older 
12.6
% 
15.7 
16.8 
17.0 
26.7 
21.2 
1 
QD10 (dummy interval): the omitted category Male is coded = 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
Appendix B. Component Indices of Confidence in the EU 
Table 1.A.A EU Strengths (n = 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and 
Responses  
Stats 
Index of 
EU 
Strengths 
QA7A    Generally speaking, do 
you think  
              that (YOUR 
COUNTRY)’s  
              membership of the EU is 
a good  
              or bad thing? 
3 = A good thing 
2 = Neither nor 
1 = A bad thing 
55.2% 
30.3 
14.5 
 QA9A    At the present time, 
would you say that, in 
general, things are going in 
the right or wrong 
direction in the EU? 
3 = Right direction 
2 = Neither nor  
1 = Wrong direction 
47.8% 
23.4 
28.8 
 
 QA10    Do you tend to trust or 
not trust the European 
Union? 
1 = Tend to trust
1
 58.6% 
 QA11    In general, does the EU 
conjure up for you a 
positive or negative image? 
5 = Very positive 
4 = Fairly positive 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Fairly negative 
1 = Very negative 
8.1% 
39.6 
36.6 
12.1 
3.6 
 QA12     What does the EU mean 
to you personally? 
Positive Meanings: 
…Peace 
…Economic prosperity 
…Democracy 
…Social protection 
…Freedom to travel, study 
and work anywhere in the 
EU 
…Cultural diversity 
…Stronger say in the 
world 
…Euro 
 
 
 
1 = Mentioned
2
 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
 
 
 
28% (8456) 
21.2% 
(6411) 
24.2% 
(7307) 
13% (3929) 
49.8% 
(15057) 
 
20.4% 
(6159) 
24.3% 
(7335) 
35.3% 
(10659) 
 QA12     What does the EU mean 
to you personally? 
Negative Meanings: 
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…Unemployment 
…Bureaucracy 
…Waste of money 
…Loss of our cultural 
identity 
…More crime 
…Not enough control at 
external borders 
1 = Not Mentioned
3
 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
85.7% 
(25913) 
81.7% 
(24716) 
82.0% 
(24790) 
88.5% 
(26753) 
83.9% 
(25377) 
85.8% 
(25954) 
 QA14     Do you tend to trust or 
not trust  
              the Council of the EU? 
1 = Tend to trust 
 
61.0% 
 
 QA18B  On the whole, are you 
very  
              satisfied, fairly satisfied, 
not very  
              satisfied or not at all 
satisfied  
              with the way democracy 
works   
              in the EU? 
4 = Very satisfied 
3 = Fairly satisfied 
2 = Not very 
satisfied 
1 = Not at all 
satisfied 
7.7% 
54.3 
30.3 
7.8 
 
 QA20     Do you agree or disagree 
with  
              the following statement: 
What   
              brings the citizens of the  
              different countries 
together is  
              more important than what  
              separates them. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
32.5% 
51.6 
13.2 
2.7 
 
 QA20     Do you agree or disagree 
with  
              the following statement: 
The EU  
              is indispensable in 
meeting  
              global challenges. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
32.2% 
46.0 
16.3 
  5.5 
 QA25     Would you say that you 
are very  
               optimistic, fairly 
optimistic,  
               pessimistic or very 
pessimistic  
4 = Very optimistic 
3 = Fairly optimistic 
2 = Fairly 
pessimistic 
1 = Very pessimistic 
  9.6% 
61.8 
23.7 
  5.0 
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               about the future of the 
EU? 
 Sub-Index of EU Strengths
4
 Mean 
(sd) 
Min – Max 
28.64 
(6.09) 
7.0 – 43.0 
1
 QA10 and QA14 (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend Not to Trust is coded = 0. 
2 
QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Not mentioned is coded = 0.
 
3 
QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Mentioned is coded = 0. 
4 
Sub-Index of EU Strengths =
 
Nation Membership + EU Direction + EU Trust + Image of The 
EU + EU Personal Meaning+ Council of the EU Trust + Democracy Satisfaction
 
+ Citizens 
Brought Together + EU Indispensability + Future of the EU. Possible range: 7.0-43.0. 
Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06
**
 to .49
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
Table 1.A.B. EU Weaknesses (n = 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and 
Responses  
Stats 
Index of EU 
Weaknesses 
QA20     Do you agree or disagree  
  with the following 
statement:  
  The European Union has  
  grown too rapidly. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
25.3% 
42.2 
27.3 
5.3 
 QA20     Do you you agree or  
 disagree with the following   
 statement: At the current 
time, the EU is short of 
ideas/projects. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
17.0% 
37.5 
35.5 
9.9 
 
  
 
Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses
1
 
Mean 
(sd) 
Min – Max  
5.45 
(1.38) 
2.0 – 
8.0 
1 
Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses = EU Growth Too Rapid + EU Idea Shortage. Possible range: 
2.0-8.0. Correlation between these indicators was .28
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
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Appendix C. Component Indices of Informed Citizenry 
 
Table 1.B.A. General EU Knowledge (n = 11151 - 13731) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and 
Responses  
Stats 
Index of 
General 
EU 
Knowled
ge 
QA13. Have you heard of the 
Council of the EU? 
1 = Yes
1
 73.5% 
QA17. True or False: The EU 
currently consists of twenty-five 
member states. 
1 = False (Correct)
 2 
 
44.4% 
 
QA17.True or False: The Irish voted 
“yes” to the second referendum on 
the Lisbon Treaty held on October 
2
nd
, 2009. 
1 = True (Correct) 81.9% 
 QA17. True or False: The Euro area 
currently consists of twelve member 
states. 
1 = False (Correct) 43.9% 
 QA19A.  Do you tend to agree or 
tend to            disagree with the 
statement: I understand  
how the European Union works. 
 
1 = Tend to agree
3 
 
 
49.3% 
 
 QA19B. Do you tend to agree or tend 
to                   disagree with the 
statement: The interests of (OUR 
COUNTRY) are well taken into 
account in the EU. 
 
1 = Tend to agree 
 
44.2% 
  
Index of General EU Knowledge
4
 
Mean 
(sd) 
Min – Max 
3.71 
(1.28) 
0.0 – 
6.0 
1 
QA13 (dummy interval): the omitted category No is coded = 0.
 
2 
QA17 (dummy interval): the omitted category True/False (dependent on which is the correct 
answer) is coded = 0.
 
3 
QA19A/B (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend to Disagree is coded = 0.
 
4 
Index of General EU Knowledge = Heard of Council of EU + Member States + Lisbon Treaty + 
Euro Member States + How EU Works + Interests of Own Country in EU. Possible range: 0.0–
6.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .03
**
 to .30
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
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Table 1.B.B. Knowledge of Policy (n = 13334 - 13409) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and 
Responses  
Stats 
Index of 
Knowledge 
of Policy 
QC6      Certain measures aimed at  
              combating the current 
economic  
              and financial crisis are 
currently  
              being discussed within  
              European institutions. How  
              effective would a more   
              important role for the EU 
at an   
              international level in 
regulating  
              financial services be in  
              combating the crisis? 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very 
effective 
1 = Not at all 
effective 
18.7% 
59.3 
18.9 
  3.0 
 QC6      Certain measures aimed at 
combating the current 
economic and financial 
crisis are currently being 
discussed within European 
institutions. How effective 
would the surveillance and 
supervision by the EU of the 
activities of the most 
important international 
financial groups be in 
combating the crisis? 
 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very 
effective 
1 = Not at all 
effective 
 
 
24.6% 
53.4 
18.6 
3.4 
 QC6      Certain measures aimed at 
combating the current 
economic and financial 
crisis are currently being 
discussed within European 
institutions. How effective 
would a stronger 
coordination of economic 
and financial policies 
between all the EU member 
states be in combating the 
crisis? 
 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very 
effective 
1 = Not at all 
effective 
 
26.6% 
56.0 
14.9 
2.5 
 QC6      Certain measures aimed at 
combating the current 
economic and financial 
crisis are currently being 
 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very 
 
29.0 
49.1 
17.9 
126 
discussed within European 
institutions. How effective 
would a supervision by the 
EU whenever public money 
is used to rescue a financial 
institution be in combating 
the crisis? 
effective 
1 = Not at all 
effective 
4.1 
 Sub-Index of Effective Combatting 
Measures
1
 
Mean 
(sd) 
Min – Max 
12.12  
(2.46) 
4.0 – 
16.0 
1 
Index of Knowledge of Policy = EU Regulating Financial Services + EU Surveillance and 
Supervision + Member Coordination of EU Policies + Supervision by the EU. Possible range: 
4.0–16.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .52*** to .65*** and significant at .000 
level. 
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Appendix D. Component Indices of Economic Elites and Their Health 
 
Table 1.C.A. Personal Economic Health (n = 12134 – 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concepts Indicators Values and 
Responses  
Stats 
Index of 
Personal 
Economic 
Health 
QA1      On the whole, how satisfied 
are  
             you with the life you lead? 
4 = Very satisfied 
3 = Fairly satisfied 
2 = Not very satisfied 
1 = Not at all satisfied 
20.2% 
53.2 
19.2 
7.3 
 QA2A   How would you judge your 
current personal job 
situation? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather good 
2 = Rather bad 
1 = Very bad 
15.8% 
46.6 
23.4 
14.3 
 QA2A   How would you judge the 
current financial situation of 
your household? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather good 
2 = Rather bad 
1 = Very bad 
8.3% 
52.6 
29.3 
9.8 
 QC5      Could you tell me whether 
you totally agree or disagree 
with the following statement: 
Overall the Euro has 
mitigated the negative 
effects of the current 
financial and economic 
crisis. 
 
4 = Totally Agree 
3 = Tend to Agree 
2 = Tend to Disagree 
1 = Totally Disagree 
 
13.8% 
38.2 
31.5 
16.5 
 QD4      Thinking about your 
purchasing power, that is to 
say the things that your 
household can afford, if you 
compare to your present 
situation 5 years ago, would 
you say it has improved or 
gotten worse? 
 
3 = Improved 
2 = Stayed the same 
1 = Got worse 
 
16.8% 
36.1 
47.0 
 
 D15A    What is your current 
occupation? 
1 = Non-Active 
2 = Unskilled Workers 
3 = Merchants 
4 = Skilled Workers 
5 = Managers 
6= Professionals 
53.9% 
3.4 
4.5 
25.5% 
9.0 
3.6 
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 D61       On the following scale, step 
‘1’ corresponds to “the 
lowest level in the society”; 
step ‘10’ corresponds to “the 
highest level in society.” 
Could you tell me on which 
step you would place 
yourself? 
1 = Box 1 – lowest 
level  
2 = Box 2 
3 = Box 3 
4 = Box 4 
5 = Box 5 
6 = Box 6 
7 = Box 7 
8 = Box 8 
9 = Box 9 
10 = Box 10–to 
highest 
1.7% 
3.2 
8.9 
13.7 
28.7 
19.3 
15.6 
6.9 
1.3 
0.8 
  
Sub-Index of Personal Economic 
Health
1
 
Mean  
(sd) 
Min – Max 
21.5  
(4.42) 
7.0 – 
34.0 
1 
Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health = Life Satisfaction + Personal Job Satisfaction + 
Financial Situation Satisfaction + Mitigation of Negative Effects + Purchasing Power Change + 
Level in Society + Occupation. Possible range: 7.0 – 34.0. Correlations among these indicators 
range from .05
**
 to .66
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
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Table 1.C.B. National Economic Health (n = 11906 - 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concepts Indicators Values and Responses  Stats 
Index of 
National 
Economic 
Health 
QA2a    How would you judge the 
current  
             situation of the (Nationality)  
             economy? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather Good 
2 = Rather Bad 
1 = Very bad 
1.3% 
22.6 
49.3 
26.7 
 QA2a    How would you judge the 
current  
             situation of the European 
economy? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather Good 
2 = Rather Bad 
1 = Very bad 
2.3% 
34.1 
51.8 
11.8 
 QA2a    How would you judge the 
current  
             situation of the world 
economy? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather Good 
2 = Rather Bad 
1 = Very bad 
15.9% 
59.2 
23.4 
1.5 
 QB5      Would you say that the 
European  
             economy is performing 
better,  
             performing worse or 
performing as  
             well as the American 
economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well 
As 
1 = Performing Worse 
37.2% 
28.8 
33.9 
 QB5      Would you say that the 
European  
              economy is performing 
better,  
              performing worse or 
performing as  
              well as the Japanese 
economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well 
As 
1 = Performing Worse 
28.9% 
20.1 
51.0 
 QB5      Would you say that the 
European  
              economy is performing 
better,  
              performing worse or 
performing as  
              well as the Chinese 
economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well 
As 
1 = Performing Worse 
36.7% 
15.3 
48.0 
 QB5      Would you say that the 
European  
              economy is performing 
better,  
              performing worse or 
performing as  
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well 
As 1 = Performing 
Worse 
 
60.4% 
13.7 
25.9 
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              well as the Indian economy? 
 QB5      Would you say that the 
European  
              economy is performing 
better,  
              performing worse or 
performing as  
              well as the Russian 
economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well 
As 1 = Performing 
Worse 
 
61.9% 
16.3 
21.9 
 
 QB5      Would you say that the 
European  
              economy is performing 
better,  
              performing worse or 
performing as  
              well as the Brazilian 
economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well 
As 1 = Performing 
Worse 
 
64.9% 
14.8 
20.2 
  
Sub-Index of National Economic 
Health
1
 
Mean 
(sd) 
Min – Max 
19.54 
(3.58) 
9.0 – 
30.0 
1 
Sub-Index of National Economic Health = National Economy + European Economy + World 
Economy + EU vs. American + EU vs. Japanese + EU vs. Chinese + EU vs. Indian + EU vs. 
Russian + EU vs. Brazilian. Possible range: 9.0 – 30.0. Correlations among these indicators 
range from .05
**
 to .65
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
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Appendix E 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix: Indices of Confidence in the EU, Informed Citizenry, and Their 
Quality of Life, Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 (n = 8832 – 13797) 
 
 
Index:  
Confiden
ce 
Index: 
Informe
d 
Index
: 
Healt
h 
Wester
n 
Easter
n 
Mediterranea
n 
Sex Age 
Index of 
Confidence 
in the EU
1
 
1.0  .53
*** 
.34
***
  -.09
**
 .02 .08
***
 -.04
*
  -.07
**
 
Index of 
Informed 
Citizenry
2
 
 1.0 .24
***
 -.08
**
   -.00 .11
***
  -.06
*
  -.01 
Index of 
Economic 
Elites & 
Their 
Health
3
 
  1.0 .24
***
  -.13
***
 -.12
***
  -
.07
**
 
 -.06
*
 
Western
4
    1.0  -.65
***
  -.39
***
  -
.05
*
 
.12
***
  
Eastern
4
     1.0 -.35
***
 .05
*
  -.08
**
  
Mediterrane
an
4
 
     1.0 .00  -.02
*
 
Female (1)
5
       1.0 -.05
*
  
Age
6
         1.0 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 
level (2-tailed). 
1
 Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding. 
 
 
 
